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ABSTRACT
In 1954 the Air Force decided to locate two air bases in
North Dakota. After deciding on locations at Fargo and
Bismarck, the Air Force then changed the locations to Grand
Forks and Minot. The decision created an uproar in the state
as each major city fought to receive a base. Another
controversy erupted over the site selection within Grand
Forks County when the Air Force changed the locations from
its original choice.
A wide variety of research sources were used in the
the paper. The papers of United States Senator Milton R.
Young were extensively used. Government documents in the
form of court cases, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers documents,
and Congressional were greatly utilized. The author examined
numerous newspapers and conducted many personal interviews.
A large number of secondary sources were also employed,
including numerous books and articles on the development of
the Air Force in the 1950's.
Based upon its required mission and goal at that time,
the Air Force selected the correct sites in North Dakota
for the two air bases. The controversy broke out as each
North Dakota city competed for a base and the Air Force
failed to explain all the factors in selecting each site.
x

CHAPTER 1
THE AIR FORCE IN TRANSITION, 1946-1956
Many elements led to the creation and the site selection
of Grand Forks and Minot Air Force bases in North Dakota in
1954. Although these bases were constructed, in the mid1950's, their roots extended as far back as the immediate
post-World War II years. Both bases were part of an overall
defense plan rather than isolated projects. The growth and
transition of the Air Force, with its Air Defense and Air
National Guard components, greatly influenced the establish
ment of the Norrh Dakota air bases. The development of an
automated radar system was equal-O'' important. The automated
system would become the center of the two bases. This
chapter examines briefly the foundation of the bases— the
growth of the Air Force and the development of an automated
radar system.
During the post-World War II era the United States began
a concerted effort to upgrade its defensive military
capabilities. The Air Force became the primary recipient of
increased funding and congressional support. The congress
ional and Air Force leaders were apprehensive with each new
development in Soviet military technology. Fearing a mass
nuclear bomb raid on the country, the Air Fcice initiated a
i
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series of defense measures to detect and prevent a possible
attack.
The danger on the horizon appeared closer as the Soviet
Union produced more of the Boeing B-29 Superfortress copy
cats, the Tupolev 4 Bull, and later, the faster Type-31
bomber. In 1943 the U.S. had landed three B-29 bombers at
Vladivostock, U.S s.R.. The Soviets kept the B-29s copying
the design and use- it as their main long-range bomber
force. The Soviets had an estimated 1,300 TU-4s and over two
hundred Type-31 bombers in 1953.1 Both aircraft could easily
reach locations in the U.S. from air bases in the northern
Soviet Union at the Chukotsk Peninsula, Novosibirsk, or
Severnaya Zemlya.
The shadow of Pearl Harbor, with its destruction from
unreadiness, hung heavily in the memories of the Air Force.
Post-war planning had to prevent another surprise attack.
The feelings of the military as a whole were summed up by
U.S. Army General Omar Bradley, "I firmly believe that if a
third World War should start, that it would start by an
attack on the United States." Furthermore, Bradley felt the
war would start "very much like the last war started, as far
as we were concerned, by a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor."
Meanwhile, it was estimated that within one hour of
being notified,

10 percent of the Strategic Air Command's

(SAC) Convair B-36 Peacemaker and Boeing B-47 Stratojet
bombers could become airborne. The percentage increased to
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50 percent with two hours and 90 percent with three hours
notice. In 1950 the warning time of an impending attack was
less than one hour. The kill rate also depended upon the
amount of advanced notice.3

The best estimates put the rate

at 15 to 20 percent during a day attack but less than 5
percent at night.
The concern that the Soviet Union would be heading down
from the Artie at any moment, ready to destroy the nation,
reached a high point in 1953. Popular magazines such as
Colliers and Fortune carried articles that featured mass
attack scenarios in which eleven to thirty-five million U.S.
citizens would perish and the U.S. would be destroyed as a
world power.4

While such articles might appear to be out of

the norm, in reality they portrayed the general consensus
among the military and government that such a disasterous
attack could happen, as conveyed by General Bradley's
statements.
Successful air defense depended on sufficient warning
time to launch a counter-attack. The interceptor force
required adequate time to be alerted and make the inter
ception. SAC needed the time to get its bombers and refuel
ing tankers off the ground and out of danger. But in 1947
the severe deficiency in early warning radar detection
around the U.S. limited the high ratio of defense kills and
surviving SAC aircraft. The radar perimeter fence around the
country then consisted primarily of the General Electric
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CPS-6B and Bendix FPS-3 radars. The range on both extended
no more than two hundred miles, while the average effective
range approximated 150 miles.5

With such a short detection

distance, warning time would be much too short. To further
complicate matters, radar range functioned better at high
altitude but could not operate at lower altitude, which
provided £ safe path for enemy bombers. The earth's curva
ture and mountains also caused "dead-space" where the radar
could not reach.
Another problem that faced the Air Force involved the
large amount of time wasted in detection and interception in
what became known as the Manual System. When, and if, the
radar detected the enemy, the radar controller wasted
valuable time by mathematically computing coordinates and
passing the information on to a higher command, using
unreliable communications equipment. At each radar station
exhaustive mathematical computations were required to plot
the unknown "blip1 on the screen. As a result of constantly
monitoring the radar screen and computing math problems,
controllers suffered fatigue and made frequent mistakes.
The higher commands also wasted more time plotting the
course and relaying the information to the interceptors.
Under such circumstances a saturation raid, as expected by
the Department of Defense, would quickly overload the radar
system and cause a breakdown. While the interceptors knew
the general direction of the enemy, they did not know the
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exact location.
In 1950 the existing radar system and its method of
interception could notify the military of a Soviet attack
but would leave little time for action before the bombers
flew overhead. Prior to the establishment of several radar
lines in Canada by 1955, the network consisted of several
thin and widely distributed radar screens around the
country. The Air Force would have less than thirty minutes
to intercept the bombers. A Soviet mass attack of TU-4 and
Type-31 bombers would be at the edge of the U.S. before the
CPS-6B and FPS-3 radars picked them up. The northern radar
network with stations, such as Minot Air Force Station,
North Dakota, could reach approximately one hundred fifty
miles north to the 50th parallel. The TU-4, capable of 420
mph, and the Type-31, capable of 460 mph, would be in the
U.S. within minutes after detection.
Furthermore, the northern border, the most obvious route
of a Soviet attack because of its shorter flight path, did
not have an adequate fighter interceptor force in place to
meet the attack. In a concentration of air bases in the
northeast and Washington the Air Force had only two air
defense bases, Great Falls in Montana and Oscoda in
Michigan, to guard the northern perimeter. The Soviet
bomners would be free to fly into the heartland through
North Dakota to attack SAC bases and populated areas.
Faced with such a grim picture and a growing Soviet air
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power, the Air Force took a three-way approach to defend the
country against the impending attack. First, the existing
base structure would be expanded from forty-five wings in
1948 to a proposed 143 wings in 1951.5 Second, the abilities
of the Air Defense Command (ADC) would be strengthened
concurrently with the increase in wing strength. Third, the
feeble radar detection system would be completely upgraded
into a continent-wide radar detection and interception
system. Among other things, these reactions would result in
the establishment of both Grand Forks and Minot Air Force
bases in 1954.
These actions were accompanied by a 300 to 400 percent
increase in the Air Force budget between the years 1950 and
1957. In 1950 the Air Force received $4.7 billion, but
following the outbreak of the Korean War this figure climbed
to $22.3 billion by 1952. As a reflection of the "New Look"
and an end to the war, the Air Force received only $11.4
billion jn 1954, but by 1957 funds had increased to $17.7
billion.7
At the end of World War II the Army Air Force had 1,895
installations world-wide of which 1,333 were in the United
States. By the end of 1948, following rapid de-mobilization
and separation from the Army, the Air Force had 290
installations, with 112 in the United States. Of these 112,
ninety were active.8

In July 1948 the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(JCS) recommended an increase of wing size to seventy, but
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in October .Congress authorized only forty-eight. This was an
increase of only three wings over the existing forty-five.
As the Air Force consolidated its forces, the total number
of installations continued to drop, descending to one hund
red eighty by the end of 1948.9
In response to the 1949 explosion of an atomic bomb by
the Soviets, in 1950 the JCS recommended another increase to
ninety-five wings by June 1953. President Harry Truman con
curred but moved the completion date forward to 1952.
Between 1950-53 the selection, construction, or reutili
zation of existing structures became a major task. The rise
in construction costs led Truman to insist upon the utili
zation of any existing facility if the. mission requirements
could be met. The Air Force contemplated using inactivated
World War II bases but found most of them unsuitable for the
modern jet age. Many were in locations too close to populat
ed areas or did not permit expanding base facilities. The
new jet aircraft required longer runways and more clearance
around the base than most World War II installations could
provide.
The National Security Council (NSC) and the JCS advised
the President of the need to expand airpower to deter war.
On 18 October 1951 the Air Force received authorization to
expand to 143 wings with the base structure to be in place
by 1 January 1955. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force
Chief of Staff, stated that the origin of the 143-wing
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program came from of four developments: the development of
the atomic bomb by the Soviet Union in August 1949; the
Communist invasion of South Korea in June 1950; the commit
ment of the United States to join the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization; and the calculation by the JCS that by the
middle of 1954 the Soviets would be able to launch an attack
against the United States.10
When Dwight D. Eisenhower became president in 1952 and
the Republican party gained control of Congress, a new
direction in the Air Force build-up took place. Eisenhower
ran on a platform of economy and a balanced budget. In
February 1953 Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson froze
construction until "each project had been reviewed and
specifically cleared by the Secretary of the Air Force, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Bureau of the Budget."11
Furthermore, the essential projects would employ strict
use of economy. As a result of the decrease, construction
was deferred on fourteen U.S. bases and six overseas. In May
1953 while waiting for the results of the review, the Air
Force established an "interim" program of 120 wings in place
of the 143. The 120 were to be in place by mi.d-1956.
While many within the Air Force disagreed with the 120wing program, General Lee Washbourne, Director of Installa
tions, stated that the program would "represent a very sub
stantial increase in the combat strength of the Air Force."
He went on to say, "In addition to achieving this active
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force, the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve will
have substantially increased quantities of first-class air
craft available."12
The new JCS met in Washington, D.C., in July 1953 to
discuss the overall milit ry budget. On 12 August the
Soviets exploded their first hydrogen bomb. In response the
JCS recommended an increase in airpower. In December 1953
the Eisenhower administration increased the 120-wing program
to 137 which gradually replaced the projected goal of 143.
The "New Look" in military planning was designed for the
long-term military scenario rather than viewing 1954 as
D-Day. On 10 June 1953 Eisenhower stated that the defense
policy of the future could not be "a mere repetition of
today's reflex to yesterday's crisis."13 The 137-wing
program placed increased emphasis on protecting the
continental U.S. and the massive nuclear retailitory force
of SAC. In the 137-wing program five new sites were
announced including the "Fargo area, North Dakota." In
addition, eight sites were to be re-activated, including the
"Bismarck Airport, North Dakota."14
While the Air Force increased its wing size during the
post-war period, it also responded to the Soviet threat by
increasing the strength of the ADC. On 27 March 1946 the Air
Force had created the Air Defense Command with the duty
"to organize and administer the integrated air defense
system of the continental United States."15 Congress had
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appropriated little funds, personnel, or material to carry
out the mission, since the U.S. was the sole possessor of
the atomic bomb, and it would be many years, it was thought,
before the Soviet Union would produce its own. In 1946 only
two fighter interceptor squadrons existed, the 414th Night
Fighter Squadron at March Field, California, with no air
craft, and the 425th Night Fighter Squadron also at March
Field. The first east coast defense unit, established on 21
May 1947, was the 318th Fighter Interceptor Squadron at
Mitchell Field, New York.16 Mitchell Field served as head
quarters for the ADC with Lieutenant General George E.
Stratemeyer in command.
Since the Air Force emphasized the offensive strength of
SAC rather than the defensive capabilities of the ADC,
General Stratemeyer decided to build a force on existing
materials. In 1947 he stated that one of his primary goals
was to "concentrate the bulk of all available air defense
forces in defense of one strategic area believed at that
time to be most subject to attack."17 Following the Soviet
suppression of Czechoslovakia on 29 February 1948 and the
Berlin blockade on 26 June 1948, Stratemeyer established air
defense units in the northeast, northwest, and Los AlamosAlbuquerque defense areas. By early 1949, two air divisions,
the 25th in the east and the 26th in west, had been created
to guard the northeast and northwest.
Following the beginning of the Korean War on 25 June
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1950, the ADC began operating on a twenty-four-hour alert
status. The war facilitated the separation of the ADC into
an independent command on 1 January 1951. The Air Force
recognized the need for a single command devoted solely to
air defense. Lieutenant General Ennis C. Whitehead assumed
command, and the headquarters were moved to Colorado
Springs, Colorado. The ADC divided the country into three
geographic areas, the Eastern Air Defense Forces with
headquarters at Mitchell Field, New York, the Central Air
Defense Forces with headquarters at Kansas City, Missouri,
and the Western Air Defense Forces with Headquarters at
Hamilton AFB, California.18 On 1 September 1954 further
reorganization took place with the creation of the
Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) with General
Benjamin W. Chidlaw in command. CONAD integrated all three
service organizations devoted to air defense— ADC, Navy
radar ships and aircraft, and the Army anti-aircraft
weapons— into one command.
Besides operational changes, the ADC underwent a period
of rapid expansion. Following the Soviet explosion of the
hydrogen bomb, the Air Force increased ADC wings by five.
In the 137-wing Air Force, Congress approved the establish
ment of six ADC bases along the northern border, tentatively
this would include: the Fargo area and Bismarck Airport,
North Dakota; Klamath Falls, Oregon; Glasgow area, Montana;
K.I. Sawyer Airport, Michigan; and the Cadillac area,
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Michigan.19

By 1955 the Air Force had fifty-six ADC wings of

which half occupied their own base.
After expanding to fifty-six wings, the Air Force chose
to decrease the size of the ADC. By 30 June 1959 Congress
authorized only twenty-seven ADC wings and, by 1960 only
twenty-five.

Several reasons precipitated the decline.

First, the high costs of maintaining an active interceptor
force and newer aircraft forced a decline in operations.
The ADC's budget had doubled from $150 million in 1955 to
$305 million in 1958.21 As the bills began to add up,
Congress became increasingly concerned. The Air Force,
accustomed to spending $350,000 for the F-86 or $700,000 for
the F-94, had to face a price tag of $3.3 million for the
top of the line interceptor, the F-106. Second, the
capabilities of the new aircraft and weapons permitted a
greater area of operations allowing some air defense units
to be phased-out. Third, the successful launch of the Soviet
Sputnik I in October 1957 proved that the Soviet Union had
concentrated its efforts into the inter-continental
ballistic missiles (ICBM) program. The Soviet Union had not
built the projected number of new advanced bombers which the
Department of Defense had estimated, but, instead, directed
their efforts into developing the ICBM. Fourth, the growing
strength of the Air National Guard presented a viable and
cheap interceptor force. Since its establishment in April
1946, the ANG had become an integral component of air

13
defense.
Congress created the ANG with the primary mission of air
defense. The ADC held the responsibility to "maintain units
of the Air National Guard and the Air Reserve in a highly
trained operational condition of readiness."22 Unfortunate
ly, the states maintained a tight control ever the units and
did not permit the effective integration into the active Air
Force. By 1947 thirty ANG squadrons had become active,
including the 178th Fighter Squadron at Fargo, North Dakota,
with seven of the thirty squadrons theoretically operating
under the ADC.23 Following the outbreak of the Korean War in
1950, the relationship between the ANG and the Air Force
began to change. On 10 February 1951 twenty-one ANG squad
rons were federalized, raising the number of air defense
squadrons from twenty-one to forty-two. Federalization per
mitted the ANG squadrons to be trained on modern jet air
craft. The ADC subsequently returned the squadrons to the
states in November and December 1952.
In December 1952 the 138th Fighter Interceptor Squadron
(FIS) at Hancock Field, New York, and the 194th FIS at
Hayward, California, became the first ANG squadrons to main
tain an alert status.24

On 18 May 1953 the ADC submitted a

plan for thirteen additional ANG squadrons to be on the
alert program, among these were the 175th FIS at Sioux
Falls, South Dakota, and the 178th FIS at Fargo.25

In

November 1953 the number of ANG squadrons increased to
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seventy with nineteen FIS and fifty-one squadrons assuming a
dual fighter-bomber role. It was not until 15 August 1954
that a full-scale alert program commenced which still
included the 178th at Fargo. Nineteen squadrons, including
the 178th, also maintained permanent alert status. 2 6

On 1

July 1956 the ADC designated all seventy ANG combat squad
rons "Fighter Interceptor squadrons".
The Air Force, in conjunction with the build-up in ADC
wings, sought to improve its manned interception force.
During World War II the Northrop P-61 Black Widow served as
the Army Air Force night fighter, but by 1950 the Air Force
still did not have an all-weather jet aircraft in its inven
tory. The Air Force decided in 1950 to procure a number of
all-weather interceptors as part of an "interim" program
before receiving advance interceptors in the late 1950's.27
Later that year the Air Force began to receive the improved
all-weather Lockheed F-94C Starfire. In 1951 the Northrop
F-89 Scorpion came into the aircraft inventory and in 1953
the North American F-86D Sabre. By the end of 1954 fiftyfive squadrons were equipped with all-weather interceptors.
In 1955 the Air Force began procurement of the McDonnell
F-101 Voodoo long-range interceptor. By 1956 the "ultimate"
interceptor, the Convair F-106 Delta Dart, began production.
The "century series" F-106 doubled the speed of the older
aircraft and had twice the range of the F-86 and F-89.
The improvement in radar detection and interception
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represented the third step taken in response to the growing
strength of the Soviet Union. At the end of World War II the
U.S. had seventy Ground Control Interceptor sites known as
the Manual System. As previously discussed the Manual System
resulted in delays and mistakes.
In 1947 the Air Force submitted a plan for a nationwide
radar network called SUPREMACY. The project intended to
build-up the air defense of the country by constructing 411
radars in the United States and Alaska at a cost of $338
million.

The plan, however, had vision but no financial

backing.
When the Soviets seized control of Czechoslovkia,
General Carl A. Spaatz, Air Force Chief of Staff, ordered
ADC to establish air defenses in the northeast, northwest,
and Alaska.29

But the materials needed to accomplish the

task did not exist. At Hanford, Washington, the ADC erected
four sets of out-dated World War II radar systems but these
♦

broke down within two weeks.

*3 f )

By April 1948 only a skeleton

of the proposed air defenses were operating in Alaska, the
northwest, and Albuquerque areas.
Several days before the Soviets began the Berlin block
ade in June 1948, Congress adjourned without acting on
SUPREMACY. In the meantime, the Air Force prepared a modi
fied program. This "crash" program intended to build a
seventy-five radar network of permanent AN/CPS-6B and
AN/FPS-3 radars and ten combat centers at a cost of eighty-
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six million dollars, was projected to be operational by
1952.

3

1

.

Construction on the permanent radar system began m

1950 and replaced the unfunded SUPREMACY. By 1952, 75 radars
of the permanent network were constructed, but they did not
achieve operational status until April 1953.32
While the Air Force waited for Congressional approval of
the modified program, the Air Force initiated Project LASHUP
in October. LASHUP diverted funds to construct a temporary
network of radars in the California, northeast and northwest
areas, and around strategic areas. By mid-1950 forty-four
LASHUP radars were complete, but after April 1955, the ADC
dismantled LASHUP in favor of the permanent radars. In mid1950 SAC bases received further radar protection as a mobile
radar plan took effect. By 1954, 107 mobile radar sites had
been positioned around SAC bases.33
In February 1950 the Air Force authorized the Ground
Control Observers to monitor for low flying aircraft. The
Ground Controllers served an important function in locating
aircraft that were out of the radar's range. By 1957 over
15,000 ground control posts operated with seventy percent
active (operating at least two hours per day).34
Along with enlarging the radar network and the Gr and
Control Observers, the Air Force began an effort t

con

struct an automated radar system designed to protect the
country against Soviet bombers. The development of the semi
automatic ground environment (SAGE) systev- oecame the
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"brain" in the new air defense and radar network. Event
ually, the Air Force placed SAGE centers at both Grand Forks
and Minot Air Force Bases. SAGE greatly reduced the time
lapse between detection of the incoming enemy, launching of
the intercept vehicle, and destruction of the target.

SAGE

handled the mathematical computations that were required to
make an interception in a much shorter time than man could.
Using digital transmission through telephone lines, rather
than oral transmission over voice radio, the system calcu
lated the earliest possible point of interception and the
flight path the fighter must fly.
The SAGE process was to be only semi-automatic because
military leaders would still make many of the decisions. As
the radar transmitted positional data to the SAGE center,
the data passed through a coordinate data transmitter which
converted the data into range and bearing. The computer
instantly plotted the course of any aircraft shown on the
radar scope. Military aircraft would be equipped with
electronic equipment (called Identification Friend or Foe,
IFF) designed to identify the plane as hostile or friendly.
Civilian aircraft filed flight plans showing their headings,
altitude, and time of arrival, with the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA) or Military Flight Service (MFS). The
CAA or MFS transferred this information into the SAGE
computers.
When an unidentified plane entered an area without the
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IFF signal, the radar monitor asked SAGE if the aircraft
could be off course from a previously filed flight plan. The
tracking monitor made the final decision as to whether or
not the blip was hostile or friendly. The computer then
requested height information from the height-finding radars
located at the same radar stations. The computer continued
to correlate each radar return with previous returns to
establish a track or to identify new objects in the area.
The computer assigned each track a number of symbols which
appeared on the screen informing the monitor whether the
object was classified friendly or hostile, the merit or
quality of the track, and a reference number.
If the monitor determined the 'blip' to be hostile, the
weapons assigner immediately organized an attack. The Inter
ceptor Director teams controlled the individual intercep
tions. SAGE determined the best vehicle for interception but
but the final decision rested with the director. The com
puter then showed the time to intercept in minutes and gave
the vector lines to indicate the initial heading of the
interceptors. SAGE controlled the interception by feeding
information to the aircraft via a radio "data link" located
in the aircraft or anti-aircraft missile.
In November 1949, George E. Valley Jr., a member of the
Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, recommended a separate
group to study the requirements of an air defense system.
On 15 December the Air Force created the Air Defense
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Scientific Engineering Committee (ADSEC). ADSEC became known
as the Valley Committee due to the energetic efforts of
Valley. ADSEC intended to study the current air defense
situation, "to bring the Air Force's presently planned air
defense system to its maximum inherit effectiveness," and
"to develop and test a full-scale small area "model" of the
best air defense system conceivable."35
In ADSEC's 24 October 1950 report, the committee con
cluded that radar warning network located around strategic
areas was out-dated and inadeguate to meet the reguirements
of modern enemy aircraft.36 The Committee saw the same
problems in the LASHUP and permanent radar programs that
existed prior to the programs. The group estimated the new
radars would only stop five to thirty percent of the in
coming bombers. The committee commented further on the
existing radar system, "ADSEC considers the contemporary Air
Defense System to be lame, purblind, and idiot-like. Idiotic
is the strongest. It makes little sense for us to strengthen
the muscles if there is no brain."37
In response, Thomas Finletter, Secretary of the Air
Force, directed Western Electric Company and Bell Telephone
Laboratories in January 1951 to upgrade the existing radar
system. The upgrade program became known as the Continental
Air Defense System or CADS.
ADSEC also recommended that a second committee be
created to study the air defense problem. In February 1951
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the Air Force accepted ADSEC's recommendations and created
Project CHARLES. Wheeler Loomis from the University of
Illinois directed the group which met from February to
August 1951 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT). Project CHARLES underwent three phases. Phase one was
an initial six month study effort by the MIT group to "re
view the broad air defense problem and make recommendations
for improving the existing system and establishing a new
O O

system."

Phase two ran concurrently with phase one and

directed the effort toward an experimental solution of the
air defense problems. From phase two emerged Project LINCOLN
in July 1951. Phase three involved a research and develop
ment program based on the findings of phases one and two.
Phase three would result in the Cape Cod System.
Project CHARLES concluded that automation was the key to
successful interceptions and that, while the current CADS
program upgraded the system, it still remained insufficient.
The group estimated that by the end of 1956 an automated
system could encircle the U.S.. The Air Force accepted these
recommendations and gave its approval to continue with the
development of a prototype system. LINCOLN chose to use
MIT's Whirlwind computer as a test-bed for the automated
system.
MIT's Digital Computer Laboratory had already developed
a digital computer, named Whirlwind, as a result of a Navy
contract beginning in 1944 to develop an aircraft stability
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and control analyzer. Initially led by Nat Sage, the MIT
group used vacuum tubes to store and retrieve information.
Whirlwind became the first real-time digital computer which
could meet the fast processing speed and reliability requir
ed by any air defense system. Jay W. Forrester pioneered the
computer and had created the random-access core memory which
doubled the operating speed, decreased the failure rate from
.

.

two hours to two weeks, and increased the input data rate.
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LINCOLN leaned heavily on the skilled personnel in the
Whirlwind project. The group also relied on technology
developed by the Air Force Cambridge Research Lab to trans
mit digital information over telephone lines. The trans
mission could provide a continuous, reliable picture of the
.

.

.
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radar to the main digital computer.

In October 1951 Whirlwind and Project LINCOLN combined
into Division 6, which led to the creation of an area
defense model, the Cape Cod System, with a computer
directional center at Cambridge, Massachusetts, a long range
AN/FPS-3 radar at South Truro, and fourteen smaller "gapfiller" radars located twenty to one hundred miles from
Boston.

4l

The 6520th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron

used the National Guard airfield at Hanscom AFB in Bedford,
Massachusetts, to test the system. The squadron had three
B-29 bombers and six jet interceptors. Over five thousand
tests were flown against the Cape Cod System.
In February 1952 Secretary Finletter gave top priority
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and funding to the development of an air defense system.
LINCOLN'S budget in the 1950's reached over twenty million
dollars a year.
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.
Later that year International Business

Machines (IBM) received the contract to design and construct
the SAGE computers. IBM instituted PROJECT HIGH in September
1952 to investigate all the air defense systems that were
being developed. IBM paid particular attention to the
efforts of the University of Michigan's Willow Run Research
Center which had created another automated defense system
called the Air Defense Integrated System (ADIS). ADIS
competed with the SAGE program until May 1953 when the Air
Force decided on the MIT program and transferred all funds
to the SAGE program.
In January 1953 LINCOLN published the Lincoln Transition
System, outlining a proposed SAGE network, while IBM began
the system design. In June 1953 IBM and Division 6 combined
into Project GRIND. Between 24 June and 15 July 1953 IBM
spent seven days hammering out many of the final technical
details and problems. With many of the technical details
solved, in September 1953 IBM received a contract to build
two single computer prototypes, the XD-1 and the XD-2. IBM
designed, built, and installed the computer, while the Rand
Corporation and Systems Development Corporation created the
master computer programs. Software had to be tailored to the
geographic setting of each sector. American Telegraph and
Telephone handled the digital ground communications and
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Western Electric constructed the block building.
A familiar feature in any place where SAGE operated,
including Grand Forks and Minot AFBs, is the huge square
block building used to house the large computers. Original
ly proposed to go underground, the Air Force decided to
locate the center above the ground, due to time and expense,
in shock resistant, reinforced concrete structures.43

The

second floor housed the duplex computers, while the first
floor contained air cooling and support equipment. The FSQ-7
computer had over 55,000 vacuum tubes and could store over
one million bits of information on weapons, climate, geo
graphy, flight paths, and all the other related inputs.44
The third floor contained office and service rooms and the
fourth floor housed the operational rooms. Outside the
building, the large air conditioning units operated to main
tain a constant temperature and humidity for the computers,
and a three thousand kilowatt power supply unit provided a
continuous power supply to the computers.45
At the same time that SAGE was in its infancy, a Summer
Study Group of approximately thirty scientists met in 1952.
The group reviewed the findings of Project LINCOLN and
looked ac the problem of air defense in the future. The
group concluded that in two to three years the Soviets would
have sufficient bombers to cripple the United States. The
best defenses that the U.S. had in existence would only stop
20 percent of the incoming bombers.46

The group recommended
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the construction of a distant early warning (DEW) radar line
and an automated system. The report reached the National
Security Resources Board in September 1952 and then went to
the NSC. The NSC recommended that the DEW line be construct
ed at once.
The U.S. and Canada had already agreed on 10 November
1950 to a line of thirty radars, the Pinetree line, in
southern Canada close to the U.S.-Canadian border to be
completed by 1953. In October 1953 the two governments
agreed to another radar line, the mid-Canada line, along the
55th parallel. To the north of the Mid-Canada and Pinetree
radars, the Air Force constructed the three thousand mile
DEW radar screen along the 69th parallel.
Before committing to the DEW project, the government
tested a prototype system at Barter Island, Alaska, in 1953.
The DEW line construction began in early 1955 following
several years of negotiations with Canada and debates over
the cost of the system. Two significant inventions made the
DEW line possible. First, the audible alarm on radar screens
to alert the monitors of incoming aircraft enabling the
radars to be manned only by a few men rather than many.
Second, reliable long-range communications to send the
signals back to the ADC Headquarters.47 The DEW line had
three types of radar installations, six main, twenty auxliary, and twenty-eight intermediate gap-fillers located
between Cape Dyer on Baffin Island, Canada, and Cape
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Lisburne, Alaska.48
As early as 1952 LINCOLN recommended several possible
arrangements of the automated SAGE system. The first
arrangement had the air defense sector supported by three
separate digital computers. All three computers were able to
conduct the air battle in that sector. In November 1953 ADC
modified the blueprint because of its high cost and proposed
the location of all three computers in one place with the
.
49
idea of greater input to the computers.

LINCOLN rejected

this idea because of the cost and delay in developing a
triplex switch for the computers. It had cost over a million
dollars to develop the duplex switch.50 LINCOLN countered by
proposing the duplex system. The FSQ-7 would be the first
computer to use a duplex arrangement. In a duplex set-up one
computer remained on inactive status, while the other per
formed the assigned tasks. The inactive computer maintained
a continuous updated data bank in case the active computer
malfunctioned. The geographic area covered by each direction
center would be determined by the volume of radar input.
Using the slide-rule principle, Table 1 shows the number of
.
51
heavy and gap-filler radars that were possible,

TABLE 1
RADAR CORRELATION FOR SAGE
Type of
Radar

Number of
Radars

Heavy......
Gap-filler..

.2...3...4...5...6
22..17..12 ... 7 ... 2
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The Air Force approved the plan in December 1953, one month
prior to the announcement of the location of the two bases
in North Dakota. Using the relationship between heavy and
gap-filler radars, the Air Force decided that sixteen air
divisions with forty-six direction centers would provide
adequate coverage.52
On 15 February 1954 the Air Force requested a revision
in the plan because of its complexity and duplicity in
certain areas from forty-six to forty-two direction centers
and sixteen to nine combat centers. The ADC approved the
decreased numbers in March 1954 and the Air Force on 17 May
1954.
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By October 1954 the ADC knew exactly where and in

what order they wanted to place the first sixteen direction
centers and four combat centers. The plan included direction
centers at Duluth, Minnesota, and Sioux Falls, South Dakota.
The plan laid primary emphasis on the northeast and west
coast followed by filling in the Great Lakes area.54
In the next few years the plan underwent more changes.
On 20 April 1955 the Air Force approved an ADC plan to cut
the sectors from forty-two to thirty-two (plus two manually
controlled sectors) and combat centers from nine to eight.
This eliminated operations within Canadian territory.55 The
new priority list included Duluth, Fargo, Sioux Falls, and
Minot. Their priority listing were eleven, twelve, thirteen,
and twenty-five, respectively.56
After 1956 the ADC's main worry concerned continued
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financial support of the program. The ADC had already
experienced a contraction in the number of wings due to the
high costs. The Air Force estimated that each SAGE center
would cost three and half million dollars, and the total
cost would be one and half billion dollars. On top of this
hefty sum, the Air Force calculated that the annual tele
phone charges at one hundred and fifty million dollars. The
telephone companies also required the Air Force to pay $222
million for liability charges.57 The total estimated annual
operating cost of the SAGE system would be over four hundred
million dollars.58
After several more revisions, delays in production, and
a freeze from July to November 1957 in deployment, the Air
Force determined by November 1957 that twenty-nine direction
centers and seven combat centers would be required.59 The
final SAGE network contained twenty-four direction centers
and three combat centers. The SAGE network, as it appeared
when completed, is shown on Map 1 on the following page.
McQuire AFB became the first operational direction center in
July 1958, On 1 July 1958 the New York Air Defense Sector
(ADS) became operational, followed by the Boston ADS,
Sy?.*acuse ADS, Washington ADS, and Bangor ADS.
In 1951 the central portion of the U.S. from Great
Falls, Montana, to Oscoda, Michigan, did not have any air
defense installations and only ten such installations
existed in the northern central-western states. Following
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SAGE RADAR NETWORK

LEGEND
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

S e a t t l e ADS
Spokane ACS
G reat F a lls ADS
Minot ADS
Grand Forks ADS
D uluth ACS
S a u l t S te M arie ADS
Ottowa ADS
B angor ADS
B o sto n ADS
S y ra c u s e ADS
New York ADS

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

W ashington ACS
D e tr o i t ADS
C hicago ADS
tfcmtgomary AES
S io u x C ity ADS
Oklahoma ADS
Denver ADS
P h o en ix ADS
Reno ADS
P o r tla n d ADS
Los A ngeles ADS
San F ra n c is c o AES

eSAGE D ir e c tio n C e n te r

Map One. Adapted from SAGE C onfiguration C h art, Maxwell AFB H is to r ic a l
Research Center Alabama, May 1982.
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the build-up of the Air National Guard and air defense
forces in the 137-wing program between 1951-1956, the
northern central-western states became a defensive wall of
computerization, radars, aircraft, and missiles, with ten
new installations and twelve new ANG locations.61

Grand

Forks and Minot Air Force bases were part of this build-up.
Both were integral links in the SAGE network across the
northern U.S. ready to defend against a Soviet bomber
attack. A combination of the Soviet threat, the urgent need
for air defense, the strategic positioning of North Dakota,
an increased reliance on air power, and the development of
the SAGE computer led the Air Force to select sites in North
Dakota for the air bases.
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CHAPTER 2
SITE SELECTION: PHASE ONE
In 1951 the Air Force received notification that its
force structure would be expanded to 143 wings. North
Dakota's strategic location and the growing Soviet bomber
capability made it logical to locate a base within the
state. The announcement of the increase touched off wide
spread activity on the part of communities that were anxious
to become the site of an air base. This chapter will examine
the selection of Minot and Grand Forks and the subsequent
controversy. While the North Dakotan people misjudged the
Air Force's intentions, the Air Force would not explain its
actions.
On the 2nd and 8th of February 1951 the Fargo Forum
revealed that on 2 February Harold Vavra, Director of the
North Dakota Aeronautics Commission had contacted Governor
Norman Brunsdale about the possibility of utilizing any of
the state's air fields for a base.1 The Forum articles
created a frantic contest within the state as several
communities lobbied to locate a base near their cities.
On 2 February, W. F. Sharp, Mayor of Jamestown, wrote
Senator Milton R. Young concerning the possibility of using
the Jamestown airport.2 Sharp was very interested in obtain
35
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ing an air base. Young contacted the proper Air Force
officials and replied that Jamestown might want to submit
any other available information.3 In response, Sharp sent a
complete packet of information on the airport to Young.
On 20 March, Brigadier General Robert E. Eaton, Director
of Legislation Liaison, replied to Young, "There is no
indication . . . that the facilities at jamestown will be
required under the current expansion program."4

Besides

Jamestown, several other communities, including Bismarck,
Minot, Williston, and Wahpeton, contacted Air Force
officials, while Fargo's mayor, Murray Baldwin, made a trip
to Washington to confer with Air Force officials.5
In October of 1951 Wesley Keller of the Aeronautics
Commission stated that, according to a "rumor," interceptor
planes would be stationed at either Fargo or Bismarck. But
Keller asserted the best site would be at Minot due to its
proximity to the radar station and the resulting time-saving
between take-off and interception.6
Meanwhile, Senator Young continued to check inuo the
possibility of having an air base in the state. Following a
Senate appropriations hearing, he discussed the issue with
General Patrick W. Timberlake, Director of Installations.7
Timberlake informed him that the Air Force was investigating
the matter. But on 12 December 1951 General Eaton wrote
Young that the Air Force did not have a military requirement
for the North Dakota area under the current program. He
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added that Hector Field in Fargo had been considered under
the 95-wing program but that other areas within the United
States had received priority/
By November 1953, the Air Force had determined the force
composition for the new 137-wing program. In keeping with
the emphasis of the "New Look," the Air Force had decided to
construct a line of air defense bases along the northern
border. The development and placement of the SAGE had
progressed far enough to begin the selection of possible
sites in the required areas. After reviewing over six
hundred-fifty locations, the Air Force wanted to proceed
with construction at Clinton-Sherman, Oklahoma, Blytheville.
Arkansas, Seymour-Johnson, North Carolina, and Myrtle Beach,
South Carolina, increase two existing bases at Columbus,
Mississippi and Moore, Texas, and to activate seven inter
ceptor bases at the Bismarck-Minot and Fargo areas, North
Dakota, Klamath Falls, Oregon, Glasgow-Miles City area,
Montana, Traverse City area and Marquette, Michigan, and the
Southern California area.9
On 30 October 1953 North Dakota Congressman Otto Kreuger
received a letter from Louise Fink of the House Office
Building stating that the Air Force would be conducting a
"routine survey" of the Fargo airport facilities.10

During

the following days Air Defense Command officials met with
city leaders in Fargo and Bismarck and collected informa
tion on the municipal airports. Both sites were selected

|
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because they were in the area of requirement and had been
used previously, during World War II.
Soon after the visit, Murray Baldwin, Mayor of Fargo,
wrote General Lee Washbourne, Director of Installations,
stating that, even though the visit was a preliminary study,
he wanted the Air Force to know that Fargo "would be pleased
to have the Air Force based here, and would offer them our
full cooperation."11 Senator Young reiterated the sentiment
of Baldwin, affirming that Hector Field "is a splendid
field" and hoped that the Air Force would "give the most
serious and sympathetic consideration" to Fargo.111 At the
time Young's statements seemed innocent enough, but his
positive appeal for Fargo would cause him trouble later. In
response to Young, Brigadier General Joe W. Kelly, Director
of Legislative Liaison, emphasized that the visits were only
part of a procedure to maintain the current status of air
ports in the country and "do not constitute any commitment
that the airfield will be utilized by the Air Force."13

The

Air Force would not announce any location in the 137-wing
expansion program until President Eisenhower had presented
his fiscal year 1955 budget in January 1954. Following the
release of the budget and official notification of the
expansion, the Air Force could select tentative sites for
the new bases. Subsequently, on 9 February 1954 General
Kelly notified both Kreuger and Young that the "Bismarck
area" and "Fargo area" were under consideration for acti
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vation "contingent upon satisfactory agreement with the
local community."14 Both Congressmen relayed the exciting
news to the Fargo and Bismarck officials. The next day
newspapers in both cities rejoiced and reported that the Air
Force had been there the previous year to examine the air
ports. Fargo officials claimed erroneously that Young had
been .instrumental in securing a site at that city.

15

The

Minot Daily News reported that Minot had been considered in
November when the initial survey teams arrived; one of the
survey officials had disclosed that an air base would be
located at either Bismarck or Minot.16
On 18 February Lieutenant Colonel Edward A. Munns of
the Master Planning Division visited Fargo to re-examine
the airport and discuss the base with city officials. The
primary purpose of the visit was to obtain a resolution
stating the city's willingness to have the base. He told
Fargo that the monthly payroll would be about $225,000 and
that the base could expand in the future over 200 percent
above the seven hundred acres requested by the Air Force.17
In addition, he showed a map which illustrated the proposed
layout of the facilities at the airport for twenty-five
interceptors. Munns asked the city to draw up a resolution
concerning the four-point reguirement. These included: that
the city provide the land by donation or lease; that the
city accept Air Force personnel into the community; that
zoning ordinances be drafted around the airport; and that
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right-of-ways for utilities be provided. Munns professed,
"We are not set on any particular site," but "We are looking
for the best one." The Air Force required the resolution
because "we don't like to put an air base near a city that
doesn't want it."18
The following day Fargo's City Commission passed a
resolution agreeing to all points except to donate the land
which it could not financially accomplish. Nevertheless,
Baldwin had been assured that the land would not be a
"stumbling block" in obtaining the base.19

The only dissent

ing voice came from Commissioner Gladys Zube, who asserted
that "the people of Fargo might as well be forewarned that
the jet base will be noisy" and there would be "problems of
sanitation and police protection."

However, she had no

overall objections to the base and voted for the resolution.
While Colonel Munns inspected Fargo, E. G. Hansen,
President of the Grand Forks Chamber of Commerce, sent a
letter to Munns after hearing that Fargo could not donate
the land.

21

Hansen stated, since Fargo was not "a foregone

conclusion," he hoped that the Air Force would consider
Grand Forks. He outlined the educational and geographic
features of the area and proposed utilizing a virgin area of
land approximately three miles northwest of the city along
the Northern Pacific Railway. The land, he observed, could
be procured "at a very nominal figure." On 20 March General
Kelly replied that the Air Force had no requirement for the
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Grand Forks area.

22

On the 22nd Colonel Munns visited Bismarck and informed
the city that the 'area' designation meant a radius of "60
miles." Munns requested that the city provide an additional
two hundred-twenty acres around the airport on a long-term
lease .23
As expected, the announcement, Munns' visit, and the
inability of Fargo to donate more land, produced a frenzy of
activity similar to that of 1951. Jamestown requested that
the Air Force make an on-site survey of its facilities and
offered the use of the airport facilities for one dollar per
year.
•

•
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Devil's Lake also strongly presented its case,

citing the advantages of its airport.
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In response to the possibility of losing the base, Fargo
stepped-up its flow of information to the Air Force. The
Fargo Board of Education and tne Fargo Board of Realtors
sent letters to Secretary of the Air Force Charles E.
Wilson, assuring him of adequate educational and housing
facilities in Fargo. The Fargo Chamber of Commerce also sent
a resolution to the Secretary, stating that the city could
provide the "educational, recreational, cultural, and
2fi
housing needs of the personnel."
On 7 April the Chamber
of Commerce telegraphed Colonel Oran Price of the Air Force
Real Estate Division, to inform him of Fargo's desire to
assist in acquiring the needed land, contending, "We will do
all within our power to help you secure the land and where
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you need it."
Senator Young soon found himself in the middle of an
intense competition and a myriad of rumors. One of the more
persistent rumors concerned the selection of Bismarck over
Minot. Bryon Kluesing, a Minot constituent, questioned Young
whether political influence had anything to ao with the
decision; since, as Kluesing alleged, Minot had been one of
the original choices.28 Young answered that Minot had not
been considered, but the choice had been made to utilize
previous World War II airports. In closing, Young expressed
his "strict policy of neutrality, particularly when one or
more cities in North Dctkota were interested in the same type
of installation."29
To complicate matters for Young, several communities,
including Mandan, Minot, and Grand Forks, requested consi
deration as sites for the Air Force Academy, while Devil's
Lake asked to be considered for any possible Army air-toground missile sites. Other cities besides Grand Forks,
Minot, Jamestown, and Devil's Lake asked to be considered as
a base site, including Valley City, Enderlin, Washburn,
Underwood, and Wahpeton.

Each community requested the aid

of Young in securing a military installation for its town.
While Young relayed information supplied by the communities
to the Air Force and directed community delegations to the
respective Air Force personnel, he continued to operate
under a policy of neutrality.
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In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed
Services in April, the Air Force still contemplated the use
of Pargo and Bismarck. General Washbourne explained that the
Bismarck airport would be a joint-use facility with that
city. In addition, the Air Force had received permission
from the Army to

utilize and rehabilitate eighty-one family

quarters at Fort

Lincoln. In reference to the Fargo base,

he explained that the base was "very important" and "the
intention of theAir Force [is] to locate
•
•
•
.
existing
airport
within the. Fargo
area." 31

the facility on

an

In further

questioning, Air Force officials stated that the Air Force
and Fargo had reached an agreement to use Hector Field for a
nominal fee. Furthermore, the Fargo proposals were "perfect
ly acceptable to the Air Force." Washbourne specified that
the Air Force wanted a twenty-five year lease, not neces
sarily a donation.32
Despite the tentative selection of Fargo and Bismarck,
the Air Force continued to review the use of the two air
ports. Following the testimony in early April, the Air Force
decided against using the municipal airports in favor of
sites outside the populated areas. The Air Force now had
four sites which could meet area and operational require
ments (Fargo, Bismarck, Minot, and Grand Forks) and, there
fore, sent another survey team to North Dakota in May to
examine those sites further.
On 11 May Colonel Fred G. Mauck, Installations Repre-
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sentative, arrived in Fargo and informed officials that the
Air Force wanted to locate seven to fifteen miles outside
the city for noise and safety reasons.33 Mauck "requested"
that Fargo buy or lease between 2,500 and 4,500 acres of
land to assure passage through Congress. City officials
informed Mauck that they could not financially or legally do
this. Nevertheless, city officials passed a resolution re
affirming its desire to have an air base. It stated, in
part, "the city of Fargo assures the Air Force that it will
cooperate to the best of its ability to help meet and solve
any and all problems."34 On the issue of the land, the
resolution declared that Fargo would provide the land "under
lease at nominal charge" at the airport but "the present
resources of the City will not permit the purchasing of
additional land by the City."
On the 12th Colonel Mauck visited Bismarck and informed
officials that the Air Force had been "a little short
sighted" in choosing sites close to populated areas. The
chances of locating near Bismarck, however, were "still good
but other sites in the defense area are being considered."35
On the subject of land, Mauck said that some of the communi
ties in the "air defense chain" have indicated that they
would provide land. He asked "if it were possible" for
Bismarck to provide some of the land. Mayor Evan Lips
informed Mauck that the city could not provide the land.
On 12 May Hansen of Grand Forks sent a letter to
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Lieutenant Colonel John Milling, Real Estate Division, after
it was announced that Hector Airport was no longer under
consideration. Hansen included a map of the previously
described "alkali" land northwest of the city in sections
14, 15, 16, 21, 22, and 23 of Rye Township totaling 3,840
acres. He stated that the land could be obtained at an
estimated twenty-five dollars per acre.36
On 13 May Mauck left Bismarck and arrived in Minot.
The Minot Daily News reported that the Air Force wanted to
locate north of the city to avoid coming into the Civil
Aeronautic Administration (CAA) air waves where the military
planes would be required to report to civil authorities.37
Minot and Grand Forks had areas free from CAA waves, unlike
Bismarck or Fargo. On the subject of the land, the paper
quoted Mauck as saying that
If the land needed for the base could be provided costfree for the government, it would make the problem of
establishing the base easier, but this is not a pre
requisite to a selection of a site and establishment of
the base.
While he was in Minot, Mauck informed Grand Forks
officials that he would like to examine sites in that area,
and on the 14th the survey team arrived in Grand Forks. The
team surveyed the area for three hours, looking primarily at
the alkali area northwest of the city in the Manvel area.38
While Mauck was examining the Grand Forks site, the Minot
Chamber of Commerce passed a twenty-seven-page resolution in
which it agreed to raise fifty thousand dollars to be used

47
toward the purchase of land.39
Mauck's four-day expedition across the state provided
new hope to by-passed communities and created paranoia in
Bismarck. On 17 May the Grand Forks Chamber of Commerce
passed a resolution, stating in part that Grand Forks would
"to the fullest extent possible within its means and author
ity, actively cooperate with the Air Force both in the es
tablishment and construction of such base."40Threatened by
Minot's monetary offer, Bismarck on the 20th

agreed to

raise $150,000 by general subscription "if that is what the
.

Air Force demands" and submitted a thirty-page resolution.
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On the 19th Valley City sent a letter to Mauck, declaring
its willingness to have the base in Valley City and to
provide a maximum of $62,500 for the purchase of needed
land.
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Bismarck, Jamestown, Washburn, Fargo, Valley City,

Devil's Lake, Minot, and Grand Forks all sent delegations to
Washington to present their cases.43
On 29 May Bismarck sent a delegation to Washington to
lobby for that city. The group included President of the
Chamber of Commerce Ed Lahr, Bismarck Tribune editor John
Hjelle, Mayor Lips, and former mayor Tom Kleppe. Upon their
return, the members stated in the official report that "it
was evident that the possibility of locating the Jet Air
Base in Bismarck was somewhat remote. It was the feeling
that all bases would be located further north than the
•

•

original proposed locations."

44

But the Bismarck Tribune
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reported in direct opposition to the pessimistic official
report that no definite news could be derived from the trip
to Washington. According to the Tribune. Lips said "he
[Lips] was confident all contacts had been made in
Washington that could help get the Bismarck story across to
the 'right people.1" 45
By the first of June the Air Force was in the review
stages for the final selection. During Congressional
hearings the Air Force submitted a revised list of bases
which included the "Bismarck-Minot area" change. In
testimony before the Armed Services Committee, the Air Force
came under more questioning concerning the sites. General J.
F. Rodenhauser, Director of Real Property, exolained to the
committee the change in the Bismarck location:
The municipal airport at Bismarck gave us considerable
concern after our survey team had been out there and
came back with photos and layouts. You could stand in
the middle of the primary runway at Bismarck and look
down it and see the church steeple or a school building
right off the end.45
He emphasized the hazards at that ^ime, but more important,
in uhe future, as the city and base expanded the hazards
would increase. General Rodenhauser explained that surveys
had been conducted around Bismarck, but "there is a stream
that winds down through there with a very abrupt escarpment.
There are hills in the immediate vicinity, and hence we had
to widen our search" to Minot and Grand Forks. In addition,
he stated that there were no expandable sites close to
Bismarck. In comparing the costs of utilizing the Bismarck
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airport against a new site, he pointed out that the cost
would be equal since new facilities would have to be built
at the airport. When asked what the Air Force would do if
the committee would not permit the language to read
'Bismarck-Minot area,' Rodenhauser responded that the Air
Force would want the 'airport' left out of 'Bismarck Air
port' to maintain some flexibility.47
With the pressure to provide land and knowing that a
decision was in its final stages, Grand Forks' Mayor Hansen
in a last minute act of desperation on 10 July, telegraphed
the Air Force stating that "Land on any of the sites
inspected to be provided without cost to Government" and the
community was ready "to construct up to 300 housing units
starting immediately upon receiving word that Grand Forks
location had been approved for base."
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The issue of land donations had concerned Senator Young,
and he had inquired concerning the practice of soliciting
donations to determine if North Dakota was being treated
fairly,, On 11 June General Kelly provided a list of sixteen
bases whose communities had donated land during the previous
five years.49 Kelly wrote that "the Air Force has an obliga
tion to the taxpayers of the nation to develop its base
structure with a minimum expenditure of Federal funds."
Furthermore, he stated "important considerations in the
selection of base sites are area of requirement, operational
capability, community support and economy of development.
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If all other factors are equal then economy of development
becomes the deciding factor." Such contributions of land,
Kelly went on to say, "would vary with the financial
capability of each community." Young forwarded copies of the
letter to officials in North Dakota, including Hjelle,
hoping to quell the controversy.
On 17 June 1954 the Air Force announced that two
2* sites
had been cnosen which included the Fargo-Grand Forks site at
Grand Forks and the Bismarck-Minot site at Minot. Both bases
would be located ten to fifteen miles northwest of the
cities. The announcement stated "the governing factors in
selecting the site locations were operational suitability,
,

*0

community support, and economical development of the site."”
The announcement set off a barrage of hostile reactions
that had been building up for weeks. Hjelle, speaking
through the Bismarck Tribune, wrote that Fargo and Bismarck
were "left hanging high and dry by the Air Force's final
determination."51 Guy Larson, a member of the North Dakota
State Legislature and resident of Bismarck', contended
angrily, "I don't feel too bad about Minot getting the air
base but I am pretty damn mad about the way the deal was
.

handled by the Air Force."
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Furthermore, he said,

Bismarck got a lousy deal on this whole airport thing.
. . . By God, when our men were presenting their case
before them, a certain Col. Mauk [sic] sat winking at a
couple of his boys like a nobleman who was amused by
simple peasants. . . . Believe me, I have never seen so
many people burned up about anything.
Larson was not a member of the Bismarck Washington delega
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tion nor present at it return meeting.
As expected, the Minot Daily News reported the selection
with much bravado and excitement. Hailing the efforts of the
Washington delegation and the twenty-seven page brochure,
the paper concluded that the strong actions taken by the
community swayed the decision.03 As in Minot, the Grand
Forks Herald published the news in equally self-congratu
latory egotism. The paper praised such efforts as bringing
the Air Force delegation to the city in "private cars,"
supplying plat-books and real estate prices, the efforts of
the city officials and Senator William Langer, and Hanson’s
visit to Washington.

A Herald editorial gave "full credit

for his [Langer's] part in the successful completion of
negotiations initiated by the professional and businessmen
of the city."5j In fact, there is no evidence to suggest
Langer contributed in any way other than forwarding informa
tion, which the other Congressmen did also. While all three
Congressmen assisted each community, Young's office became
the focal point for each community. More than likely, the
Herald wanted to get back at Young for allegedly assisting
Fargo. Young had also informed Grand Forks Herald publisher,
M. M. Oppegard, that the Air Force was set on Fargo, and it
would be useless for Grand Forks to try to get the base.55
Young isolated himself further from Grand Forks by
questioning the selection of that location when the
announcement came out. Young had inquired why the sites had
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been chosen, because he had informed. Devil's Lake they were
too far away from the area of consideration. It was his
understanding that Devil's Lake was farther from the radar
stations than the regulations in the authorizations would
permit. Since Grand Forks and Devil's Lake were approximate
ly the same distance from the Finley radar station in North
Dakota, Young wanted to know why Devil's Lake had not been
considered.57
Joe Bridston, prominent businessman and former state
Senator from Grand Forks said that Grand Forks was "quite
shocked" at Young's reaction immediately after the announcement.
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While Hal Davies, publisher of the Minot Daily News,

stabbed angrily, "Minot is surprised and disappointed by
confusion you [Young] have injected into air fields. It
certainly cannot be interpreted as a friendly action."59
Oppegara asked Young if he were "writing Grand Forks off
[his] political map so we can say so if that is the case."60
Young requested information from the Committee on Armed
Services with regards to the ‘area' designation in Fargo. In
a reply, the Air Force felt the language of the bill permit
ted the Grand Forks designation. It explained that the exact
location would be within a "circle," the center of which was
classified information.61 Furthermore, "The Air Force wit
nesses maintain that for tactical reasons it is desirable to
locate the base as close as possible to the center of this
circle and that Grand Forks is closer than is Fargo."
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On 22 June Colonel William C. Warren, Assistant
Director of Budget, answered Young's questions in more
detail concerning Devil's Lake.

62

He stated that the Air

Force's original intentions were "the use of the Fargo and
Bismarck Municipal Airports in order to take advantage of
the existing available facilities, although it was recogniz
ed at the time that these were marginally acceptable sites."
But after further review, the Air Force decided not to use
them and considered virgin sites. The Air Force re-evaluated
potential sites, in which Grand Forks and Minot
most nearly meet the criteria prescribed for the bases,
not only with respect to favorable terrain, expans
ibility and adequate community support, but also because
of their geographical location in relationship to radar
coverage and anticipated point of contact.63
Colonel Warren elaborated further on the radar coverage,
Each of our Air Defense Command bases is positioned to
fit into the pattern of our radar coverage and these
base locations are so interwoven onto our over-all
defense program that any major deviation in the location
of one would appreciably affect the operations of other
fighter bases in the same general areas of the United
States and could possibly necessitate the relocation of
those bases. By proper positioning of these bases we can
obtain the maximum protection possible with available
forces. An important factor on the selection of these
base locations was their proper positioning in relation
to existing and programmed Air Defense Command bases.54
He went on to describe some of the factors in selecting a
site,
in addition to favorable terrain and offers of commu
nity cooperation. The site must be suitably positioned
within the area of requirement, the terrain must not
only be favorable for economical base development but it
must allow for future expansibility of the base; the
site should be proximate to rail, highway and communi
cations systems; and the community must have the
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necessary off-base housing, transportation, utilities,
schools, churches, services, recreational facilities and
other amenities.65’
In relation to the efforts of Fargo and Bismarck, Warren
emphasized that "no positive actions should be taken or
expenditures made in anticipation of the proposed base."
Instead, the Air Force required initial resolutions from
the cities because it was necessary that the Air Force
obtain a favorable expression before the selection. Warren
concluded,
The selection of the Minot and Grand Forks sites, as for
all Air Force base sites, was made after careful study
and evaluation by competent engineers, technicians, and
staff officers who recommended these sites as having the
greatest capability, both from an operational standpoint
and from the standpoint of e c o n o m y . 66
Hjelle did not limit his condemnation of the Air Force
to the Tribune following the announcement; he sent letters
to Secretary of the Air Force Harold Talbott and Senator
Young, as well as eight other government officials. He
condemned the procedures of the Air Force which disregarded
the interest and feelings of the community and described the
"kiss-off" during his Washington visit. He complained that
Colonel Mauck would not provide the delegation with any
other Air Force officials to contact, or clarify if addi
tional opportunities existed. He suggested Mauck be "subject
to severe censure" and hoped "that Senator Young of our
state will seek to accomplish this in the proper way."67
Hjelle continued to attack the Air Force; in an 18 June
editorial Hjelle called for an investigation of the
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"ineptitude of the Air Force in creating the situation it
has created here. Perhaps officers who are responsible for
it should be relieved of authority before they can create
mere confusion like this."60 He went on to point out that
Bismarck must be suitable from an operational and economi
cal standpoint to have been initially chosen and community
support had been assured. On 19 June Hjelle condemned the
Air Force for quibbling over a few dollars to purchase the
land, compared with the millions the bases would eventually
cost. He then called a second time for Young to ask some
pertinent questions concerning the matter at the next Senate
Appropriations Committee hearing.69
Young thought that he had remained neutral and fair in
questioning the site selection. But with the most vocal of
the North Dakota citizens angry at the Air Force and him,
Young was becoming irate himself. On 21 June he wrote
Colonel Price, "I have never known a time when the North
Dakota people were as badly disturbed as they are at the
present time. The Air Force certainly did the world's worst
job of public relations."70
But the matter would not go away, and Young still faced
a doubting, critical constituency. On 9 July Young question
ed Senator Francis Case, South Dakota, Chairman of the
Committee on Armed Services, in the Senate.71 Yeung inquired
what military reason necessitated the change in sites.
replied that the committee had examined,

Case
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the location of radar stations, which, in part, dictate
the location of these bases. We were guided by the fact
that this particular line of bases follows the border
across the northern part of the United States. The Air
Force suggested the locations at Minot, rather than at
Bismarck, and Grand Forks, rather than at Fargo, as
being more strategic.72
On the question of whether land contributions influenced the
decision, Case replied that it did not, but
certain other considerations were involved. The stra
tegic situation in relation to the radar centers was the
most important. A second consideration— and offsetting
to the one the Senator from North Dakota has mentioned—
was the ground available and the location with reference
to the cities and the effect of using jet planes in
proximity to cities.73
Young could not bear the heat of an angry constituency
or back down from Hjelle's (one of his former employees)
demands for revenge and answers. He decided to confront the
Air Force, specifically Mauck, during the Supplemental
Appropriations hearings on 8 August to finally get some
clear answers and satisfy Hjelle's thirst for revenge.
He began his inquisition by questioning what satisfac
tory agreements were required by the Air Force and if a
donation of land was required as part of the satisfactory
agreement.74 General Washbourne replied that the agreement,
does not refer to what the city offered, or failed to
offer, in discussions with Air Force representatives.
It was intended to and still is intended to develop the
attitude of the community toward accepting an Air Force
activity. . . . many communities in this country want
nothing less than an Air Force activity introduced into
their community. On the other hand, many of the
communities around the country are agreeable to Air
Force participation.75
Young centered his attention next on Colonel Mauck's trip to
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the state. He asked Mauck if he had told the city that the
land would have to be furnished. Mauck denied the allegation
replying,
No, sir. I think I told them that if it was possible for
the city to donate the land that it would be better, it
would be simpler for us to present our project to the
Congress but there was no limitation in any way, sir,
that if the city felt they could donate the land, it was
acceptable to the Air Force.76
In a series of questions, Young than interrogated the
Air Force personnel involved in the site selection.
Senator Young: Now if neither one of these cities would
have offered to furnish land, what would you have done
with that airbase?
Colonel Mauck: We would have had to locate the base
under the same conditions that we did originally. That
is to say on the basis of the operational requirements.
Senator Young: There is about 100,000 [dollars] worth of
land involved in this $7 million base.
General Washbourne: I believe it would have gone on the
exactly same tract of land that it did go on.
Senator Young: Exactly where it did go, whether or not
the city furnished the land?
General Washbourne: That is not a material factor in the
selection of these operational bases.
Senator Young: Now we are. making some headway and
getting things straightened out. What was your reason
for first locating the airbase at Bismarck?
General Washbourne: . . . we were confronted with the
problem of fairly quickly identifying where those
[fighter interceptor] squadrons should go. Naturally the
first thing that occurred to us was to find the existing
municipal airports in the operational area and see if
they would fill the bill. That was the base of the
original survey.
Senator Young: Did you tell the cities they needed to
furnish land?

58
General Washbourne: No, sir; we did not. The fact that
the cities owned these air ports and would be expected
to lease them to us if we made an agreement was
important. We later changed our mind based on
operational problems and additional surveys. The site
reported in Bismarck after we got all of the engineering
on it had certain operational obstacles that we felt
would be inadvisable to accept as a long-range
development. They offered to help us locate a half-dozen
sites within reach of Bismarck.
Senator Young: Did they offer to donate the land?
General Washbourne: Yes, sir.
Senator Young: You moved the site to Minot for military
reasons?
General Washbourne: Exactly.
Senator Young: That is what I want on the record. And
the land had little part in that?
General Washbourne: Very little. It merely needed the
attitude of the community had they wanted the Air Force
there or objected to our presence.77
After establishing that the land issue was not a
material factor in the final selection, Young turned his
attention toward Bismarck's useless efforts. As if Hjelle
were speaking through Young, the Senator drilled Washbourne:
The city of Bismarck went to considerable effort to
prepare for this base, and it was considerable, do you
not think it would have been a good public relations act
for the Air Force to go back to Bismarck and explain to
him [sic] why you moved the Sxce to Minot?78
Washbourne could do nothing but agree and concurred that "we
could have done a better job in explaining the factors that
led to these selections to the local people."79
In an effort to allay the accusations in North Dakota,
Young now addressed the issue that political influence
entered the selection of the sites. He questioned Washbourne
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as to whether any official from Young's office or Young
himself had tried to influence the decision. Washbourne
replied that no one had.80
By now, Young began to show his indignation. Speaking
to Secretary of the Air Force James Douglas, he remarked,
"Your Colonel Mauck here and Colonel Price succeeded in
making about the worst possible mess in North Dakota."81
After reading two Bismarck Tribune editorials and Guy
Larson's letter, Young lashed into Mauck again, this time
concerning the Bismarck delegation's trip to Washington. In
reference to Larson's letter, Mauck replied, "the letters
that have arrived from Bismarck, North Dakota, are untrue.
I do not believe that they represent the true fact at all,
sir."82 In meeting witn the Bismarck group Mauck asserted,
I informed them that the Air Force had not made a
decision at that time, that we would give every
consideration to the Bismarck area and we were not in a
position at that time to give them a final decision and
that at no time did I make any arrogant statement or
other statement that have been mentioned in that letter.
I treated them with the utmost of respect, sir.83
In Mauck's defense, Washbourne mentioned that the local
people probably felt Mauck made the final decision. Instead,
his report went through a whole series of decision making
levels. At this point, Secretary Douglas inserted that the
mention of any land donations could easily be misinterpreted
by the communities to mean something it was not.84
The answers satisfied Young but, nevertheless, he
criticized the manner in which the Air Force handled the

1
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situation. He sent transcripts of the hearings to all the
major cities in North Dakota. His inquisition answered
several important questions. He ascertained the truth with
out relying on second-hand sources and quieted the dis
content within the state on all sides of the issue. But
more importantly to him personally, he preserved his appear
ance of being non-committal during the selection process.
No one in North Dakota was as pleased as Hjelle after
receiving word of Young's interrogation. He wrote Young,
"The grilling you gave those big-wigs from the Pentagon
made me feel good. I'll bet there was some real squirming
and sweating."85 Playing to Hjelle's paranoia, Young replied
that the Air Force was a "pretty cocky and inconsiderate
outfit" and "Colonel Mauck was in plenty of trouble."86
But even though Hjelle had his revenge, he remained
angry at the Air Force. In a subsequent editorial he dis
cussed the cancellation of an eight million dollar Air Force
aviation school in San Antonio, Texas. Citing a "patho
logical weakness" in the Air Force for its inherent indeci
sion, Hjelle described the Air Force as "lords of the
Pentagon" and "finger-snappers for security." He ascribed
the inability to make a firm decision to "symptoms of a
•

psychopathic weakness."

ft 7

The question still remained, were the North Dakota
citizens at fault or was Air Force for the embroilment?
Clearly, the citizens failed to comprehend fully the

61
situation and interpreted events in such a way as to confuse
matters even more. But the Air Force also made a mistake by
not throughly informing the communities ot important
military information which would have eased the tension.
The first was that the Air Force faced a very short time
period between announcing the locations and the date of
occupancy. Both bases were on the ''critical” list and the
Air Force planned to have the Fargo base ready by February
1957 and the Bismarck base by March 1956.88

Unfortunately,

in its haste the Air Force choose two existing, "marginal”
sites which in November 1953 appeared to meet their
requirements. It was a standard policy to utilize former
World War II airports or other existing sites in the area of
requirement. By 1956 the Air Force was using twenty-two
municipal fields jointly with the adjacent community, with
thirteen of these in the fighter-interceptor role.89 The Air
Force erred in announcing the tentative locations in
February without fully considering the Bismarck and Fargo
sites. If they had given the airports more consideration,
then they could have examined Minot and Grand Forks withoutcreating problems.
But when the Air Force did announce the two tentative
sites, Fargo and Bismarck made the mistake of assuming the
sites were limited to the municipal airports. In the
language of the bill, only the Bismarck Airport had been
mentioned specifically, while the Fargo base had always been
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an

area* designation. Peihaps, if the cities had known that

Mauck's visit was only a survey of possible sites, they
would not have taken the visit as seriously. But even here
the blame rests with the Air Force for its premature
announcement, since it would have been inconceivable to
suggest that the cities treat Mauck's visit lightly after it
was known two air bases would be located in the state.
The problem with the survey teams did not originate in
North Dakota. In January 1952 Secretary of the Air Force
Thomas A. Finletter explained to Congressional leaders that
the "presence of a survey team does not announce the
locality in advance," but communities tended to believe that
a survey team "proves that the Air Force has decided
•
90
something."
Finletter said that the surveys caused
problems in the local communities by producing "articles in
newspapers" which were often untrue. Even though the teams
provided valuable information on housing and community
attitude, they became a problem when the local community
blew the survey out of proportion, which is what had
occurred in North Dakota.
The preliminary survey team in November, Munns1 visit in
February, and Mauck's expedition in May were all part of a
procedure pre-planned by the Air Force. Between 1951 and
1953, the Air Force presented in Congressional testimony a
detailed outline of the procedures used to locate base sites
•
•
91
m the United States.
Following a determination of the new
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force structure, survey teams were sent to possible sites to
examine weather, terrain, expansion of runways, future
costs, communication and land costs, housing availability,
community attitudes toward the base and future Air Force
personnel, and long-term usability. The next step involved a
review of the survey findings and a reduction of the sites
to a minimum. The final selection would be made based on
cost comparisons, satisfactory negotiations with the cities,
and military considerations.
In light of this procedure, the events in North Dakota
become clearer. The November survey teams represented the
initial portion of the procedure. Munns' visit was required
to obtain an agreement with the communities before the final
selection could be made. But Mauck's visit was a combination
of the initial survey team and Munns' visit and represented
a step backward in the process. North Dakota citizens
erroneously understood Mauck's visit to be an effort by the
Air Force to confuse the selection and precipitate a state
feud. In the eyes of the Air Force, Mauck's visit was
required to simplify the selection process.
One very important question was what did the Air Force
plan to do with the bases? In 1953 the Air Force had already
received approval to implement SAGE and had tentatively
approved blueprints of the system. The area of radar and
interceptor coverage mandated that the air bases be
approximately two hundred miles apart horizontally across
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the northern U.S. in order to provide effective inter
ception within each SAGE sector. This configuration only
permitted Grand Forks, Minot, Fargo, and Bismarck to be
considered. While the other communities, such as Devils
Lake, were too far away or too close to other sites.
Throughout the inquiry into the reasons for the changes,
the locations of the site to the surrounding radar stations
played a particular role. Since the Air Force already had a
tentative SAGE blueprint in mind, it would have contemplated
which locations would be used for radar posts. The "central
point" came up most often in Congressional testimony in
reference to Grand Forks. The Pinetree radar posts at
Beausejour and Gypsumville, Manitoba, and the radar sites at
Chandler and Wadena, Minnesota, Finley, North Dakota, and
Gettysburg, South Dakota, tied into the Grand Forks sector.
By taking the radius of the radar net, Grand Forks, not
Fargo, was the most central location, which Senator Case
alluded to in his discussion with Young.
Although not discussed in Congressional testimony, the
location of Minot was also a more central location to the
radars in the Minot Air Defense Sector. The sector radar
locations included Fortuna, Minot, and Dickinson, North
Dakota, Ophiem and Miles City, Montana, Sundance, Wyoming,
Ellsworth, South Dakota, and Yorkton and Saskatoon Mountain,
92

Saskatchewan.

Later after the sites had been selected, Senator Young

65
wrote a constituent concerning the selection of the sites.
He said that the sites "were selected by the Air Force
without consulting a single member of Congress or anyone
,

%

within the state."
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Furthermore, he stated in the letter

that the radar sites had
to be located certain distances and certain directions
from the jet air bases as they will be the main
installations of an ultra new control system [SAGE]
which will not only locate the enemy planes but will
guide our own planes and guided missiles to the
approaching enemy target.
While the SAGE system dictated the horizontal distance,
several other factors determined the vertical location.
Since these were interceptor bases, the time lapse factor
and "anticipated point of contact" became paramount. Minot
was approximately one hundred-twenty miles north of
Bismarck, while Grand Forks was eighty miles north of Fargo.
The distance and time lost to reach the point of intercep
tion would have been substantial at the more southern
locations.
At the time of the announcement, the Air Force planned
to station F-89D 'Dog' aircraft at the bases. These planes
had a maximum speed of 600 miles per hour and a 1,000 mile
range.94 If the Air Force had decided to locate the bases in
Fargo and Bismarck, the combat effectiveness of the inter
ceptors would have been curtailed drastically. Taking off
from either Fargo or Bismarck, the interceptors would have
to travel an extra eighty-to-one-hundred-twenty miles, using
eight to twelve minutes of precious time. In addition, at
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the Fargo-Bismarck locations the combat range would decrease
appreciably, since the aircraft would spend one hundredsixty to two hundred-forty miles leaving and returning to
the locations.
The Air Force also wanted the aircraft to reach the
limits of the radar range which were tied into each SAGE
center. In the case of Grand Forks and Minot SAGE sectors,
the most northern radar was approximately two hundred-fifty
miles north, while the range of the radar extended the
distance another one hundred-fifty to two hundred miles
north. The aircraft would be launched prior to detection at
the Pinetree radar line, since the Mid-Canada line would
provide detection and distance of the incoming aircraft. At
Grand Forks and Minot the interceptors could reach the
limits of radar coverage and still have fuel to engage the
enemy and return to the base. At Fargo and Bismarck, the
effectiveness of the aircraft dropped drastically and
permitted the enemy to advance closer to the targets before
interception could take place.
Besides the interceptors, the Air Force planned on
locating the BOMARC ground-to-air anti-aircraft missile at
Grand Forks and Minot. The BOMARC was an air defense
missile first launched in February 1955. In a 1955 plan
Grand Forks and Minot, North Dakota, Duluth, Minnesota, and
Opheim Air Force Station, Montana, would have BOMARC units,
with both North Dakota locations operational by 1962 .95

In
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1958 the Air Force revised the plan but still included Grand
Forks and Minot. By 1960 the North Dakota sites were dropped
but Duluth remained. Since the BOMARC missile had a range of
only 440 miles, the location of the site in relationship
to the point of contact became very important. If the Air
Force had chosen Bismarck and Fargo, the effective range
would have been cut by 25 percent. By locating at Grand
Forks and Minot, the missile could reach the limits of the
air defense sectors and radar range.
In addition, there is evidence to suggest that in 1954
the Air Force had already contemplated using the proposed
bases for more than interceptors. It is highly unlikely that
military planners would have missed the point that just as
the Soviets could fly nuclear bombers more quickly [and
shorter down] from the north, the U.S. could reach locations
in the Soviet Union just as easily by using the polar route.
Approximately one year after the selection of the North
Dakota sites, the Air Force began preparing officially for
the "dispersal" of SAC aircraft.95
At Grand Forks and Minot the Air Force constructed the
runways for multi-purpose use rather than solely for
interceptors and made provisions for lengthening and
widening the runways. Runways for interceptors had a 25,000
pound weight limit but the runways at both North Dakota
bases were built with 100,000 pound limits.97 In May 1956,
as the Air Force planned to introduce the B-52 to North
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Dakota, Secretary Douglas pointed out "we had this
advantage. We built the runways with heavy duty pavement for
B-52 operation."98 The large acreage the Air Force requested
also suggests a mission larger than solely an interception.
The 200 percent expansion Munns' suggested in February to
Fargo and Bismarck became a reality within just a few years.
The land donation issue created the most turmoil. Nearly
every city offered some form of economic assistance to the
Air Force. If the land were the over-riding issue, then
Bismarck would have surely received the base, since it
offered twice as much acreage as Minot. The practice of
receiving land donations had been long established Air Force
policy. More importantly, the Air Force had already request
ed $257,000 for land at Fargo and $179,000 at Bismarck." The
Air Force explained that requests for a donation or lease
were to ease the process through Congress. But even with
land donations and leases, the Air Force purchased enormous
amounts of land. In 1953, for example, the Air Force acquir
ed 64,052 acres of land at a cost of $15,669,600J 00

It was

because of such high costs that the Air Force sought dona
tions or leases where possible. Furthermore, the Air Force
required ownership by lease or possession in order to
construct the facilities.
The cities interpreted the land issue in the wrong way.
In North Dakota the traditional east-west rivalry broke out
into a north-south rivalry too. Each city compared its
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actions to what happened elsewhere in the state and tried to
out-maneuver the competition. The newspaper articles preci
pitated the paranoia and misunderstanding by incorrectly
reporting the news. One example involved Colonel Maude's
visit. The Fargo Forum reported that Mauck "requested the
city [Fargo] buy or lease" the land, which would "assure the
forwarding of the project."'0' The Bismarck Tribune reported
Mauck as saying "if it were possible" for Bismarck to lease
or donate the land.102

The Minot Daily News declared that

Mauck assorted that the "land [is] not a prerequisite.1,103
But after three days the Grand Forks Herald chose to report
Mauck as saying to officials there the "land would have to
be provided," which Mauck later denied.104

Following the

trip to Grand Forks, the Bismarck Tribune reported that the
Air Force "demanded" the land.105

It is apparent that the

newspapers helped the confusion over the site issue by
selectively reporting the news and wording the details to
suit their own needs. Undoubtedly, Mauck1s visit was con
ducted in an uniform manner established by- the Air Force.
Mauck informed the cities that the land was not a require
ment, but because of each city's publicity and eagerness to
offer the most, the issue became clouded and distorted.
Hjelle deserves a fair amount of criticism in the
matter. He not only misrepresented the results of the
Bismarck delegation's Washington trip, but also elected to
vent his personal vendetta through the press. It is unclear
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exactly what happened in the Washington trip of which Hjelle
and Larson spoke. But it is clear that nothing remotely
associated with the "kiss-off," as Hjelle described, appear
ed in the official delegation report nor in the Tribune the
following day. If Hjelle, and the other newspapers, had
published the news correctly, without trying to maintain
morale in their communities by covering-up the facts,

(as

Hjelle had done after the Washington trip), the final
decision would not have been such a shock to the people.
Hjelle's three-point assertion in the 18 June editorial
was correct, but he failed to understand that other factors
governed the decision. It was true not only of Bismarck but
also of all four communities that they were suitable from an
operational standpoint, community support was more than
adequate, and they could be developed economically. But the
more advantageous military-strategic position of Minot and
Grand Forks ruled out Bismarck and Fargo after suitable
sites had been found in those locations.
When the Air Force decided to locate seven to fifteen
miles outside the cities, they had every reason to do so.
The Air Force embarked on a new policy during this period to
provide "bases with approach and take-off corridors seven
miles long and four miles wide," because nearly "sixty per
cent of all take-off and landing accidents occurred within
these corridors.1,106 The Air Force had to face the fact that
these bases would have nuclear weapons stored on them and
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be carried by aircraft in the future. The Air Force also
made an effort to separate the slower civilian aircraft from
the fast jet aircraft of the Air Force to avoid accidents.
The policy reflected a change from relying on existing
substandard facilities to completely new and larger
installations.
General Rodenhauser stated in Congressional testimony
that the disadvantages of Hector Airport were its close
proximity to Fargo, limited operational capabilities,
obstructions in the flight path, and takeoffs over the city.507
He added that "Fargo could never be a satisfactory Air Force
base for jet aircraft." In the case of Bismarck he stated
the disadvantages as "limited base expansion" in addition to
the same reasons cited for Fargo.
Geographic reasons also had an impact on the decision.
When the Air Force examined sites around Bismarck, they
found unacceptable terrain to the north and east of the
city. But in the south the Missouri River flowed through the
area and the county line was next to the city in the west.
Faced with an area which fell below standards, the Air Force
looked to Minot for a suitable location.
Another aspect of the equation which surely had an
impact on the outcome involved the 178th FIS Air National
Guard unit at Hector Field. As previously mentioned, the
178th had already become part of the air defense structure.
In 1953-54 the Air Force expanded the runways, aprons,
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taxi-ways, and constructed a new hanger for the ANG unit
totaling over $1.8 million.108 By 1961 the total real
property investment would be ever five million dollars.
Clearly, the Air Force did not want to integrate a regular
Air Force unit and a rapidly expanding ANG unit in one small
area. Furthermore, the Air Force persistently made an issue
of "defense-in-depth." By locating the regular interceptor
units at Grand Forks and Minot, the Air Force integrated the
ANG unit in Fargo into the SAGE radar and interception
scheme and obtained a defense-in-depth— a pattern which
would be repeated across the northern United States.109
One final question remains, did Senator Young remain
neutral in the site selection process? Clearly, he used his
influence in 1951 by discussing the possibility of obtaining
an air base in the state with Air Force officials. But
military requirements determined the need for two air bases
in North Dakota and not political influence. Young did step
out of his neutrality when the Air Force decided initially
on Fargo, but not to the extent that Fargo and the other
communities would later claim. But very soon afterwards,
Young adopted his policy of neutrality as each city asked
for his assistance. Young's problems were complicated by
a sensitive constituency that interpreted his every move in
a positive or negative manner, rather than neutral, as he
actually was.
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CHAPTER 3
SITE SELECTION*: PHASE TWO
Despite the selection of sites near Grand Forks and
Minot the Air Force still had to pin-point the location of
each base. At Minot the process would be relatively trouble
free. At Grand Forks however the original site would be
turned down, and, in the ensuing confusion, another
controversy would erupt over selection of the final site.
In Grand Forks County the Air Force initially had chosen
the "alkali flats" area in Rye Township as a site for the
base. When the Army Corps of Engineers and Air Force
examined the area more closely, they found the site inade
quate for base construction. Therefore, the Air Force
evaluated other sites within the cou ty which might meet
their criteria— ten to fifteen miles from the city, good
road and railway access, and favorable soil conditions. On
7 December the Air Force announced that two other sites were
now under consideration— one seventeen miles north of Grand
Forks in Levant Township and the other thirteen miles west
in Mekinock Township.1
Almost immediately the citizens in the Mekinock area
banded together with attorney Richard King of Grand Forks to
fight the site selection. On 9 December King on behalf of
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that residents in the Mekinock area filed a petition which
questioned the common sense of locating the base on good
farming land, as opposed to poor quality land occupied by
few residents.2
On 28 December King notified Senator Young that he
represented several of the land owners who objected to the
new site.3

He stated, "My clients own and farm some of the

best agricultural land in the Red River Valley. Their farms
are generally well cultivated and highly developed and each
year yield a very substantial farm product." He continued
"the United States Air Force, after making a reconnaissance
survey of the Grand Forks vicinity has completely dis
regarded locating on the low value land." Furthermore, "It
appears gross economic waste to pour concrete over the best
farm land in the Red River Valley." He concluded that the
area had produced $162,400 in farm products in 1953 and
would produce over two million dollars in the following ten
years. In addition, two large turkey farms, the Myra
Foundation, directly south along Highway 2, and the
Schroeder Farm to the north, would be put out. of business.
King and Carroll Day, Chairman of the Grand Forks
Site Selection Committee, had already flown to the head
quarters of the Missouri River Division of the Corps of
Engineers at Omaha, Nebraska, to discuss the new site with
Colonel Winston Fowler of the Army Corps of Engineers.
Fowler could give no assurances but informed King that the
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Corps recommendations had not been sent to the Air Force.
The recommendations would be forthcoming and would consider
the residents' desires.1’
On 4 January 1955 King wrote Young again after having
met with him in Fargo.5

At Fargo King, along with land

owners George Retheraeier, Maurice Redwing, and Leonard
Griffen, spoke to Young for an half hour, despite constant
interruptions, concerning the site selection. In the letter
King explained that the Air Force had been interested in
land in the Levant Township northwest of Grand Forks. The
Hutterite Colony in the area had offered the Air Force the
land for twenty-five dollars per acre, but the Mekinock site
would cost the government "well over one million dollars."6
Once again, he called on Young to help in the matter.
Even though King's clients did not object to the base in
the county but only to its Mekinock site, the Grand Forks
civic leaders became alarmed and took every chance to twist
the issue in their favor. Officials in Grand Forks, as well
as in Minot were convinced that the land owners would
jeopardize the base and, subsequently, their political
careers. On 11 January 1955 the Grand Forks Herald publish
ed a report that the site had already been chosen at the
Mekinock area, but it later retracted the story when the
Air Force denied the claim.7

On 30 December editor

Oppegard telegraphed Young that King represented only "four
or five" of the land owners. Oppegard's statement was a
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gross misrepresentation of the facts.8
In addition to King, Young received telegrams from
George Rethemeier and Matilda Nelson and a letter from T.A.
and Vernon Thompson objecting to the site.9

Senator Langer

also received a telegram from Nelson.10 Young informed the
Thompsons he had "been doing a lot of work on [the] matter,
but I don't know how successful I will be. I will do my
best, however."11
While Young had maintained his neutrality in the
selection of sites within the state, he did object to the
Mekinock site and contacted the Air Force at King's request.
He stated the land owners seem "in several respects [to]
make a good case."12 He could not understand why the Air
Force would desire the most productive and expensive land as
opposed to the non-productive and cheap land chosen initial
ly. In response, General Kelly replied "preliminary
engineering studies of the [Rye Township] site have not been
encouraging."13 He continued, "To provide a basis, there
fore, for evaluation of engineering, construction, and other
factors, we have been examining other sites in the general
area." He finished by stating "the Air Force is extremely
sympathetic with those persons who may be adversely affected
by military requirements. We are making every endeavor to
accomplish our objectives with as few dislocations and as
little inconvenience to the public as possible."14
Young later wrote to King:
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"If the decision goes against us, which I certainly hope
it doesn't, 1 doubt that it would be of any use to try
to stop it by Congressional Committees. It may be a
difficult thing to stop because Congress wants to get
these bases in operation as soon as possible."15
Despite Young's efforts, on 26 February Secretary of the
Air Force Harold Talbott informed Young that a site had been
chosen in Township 152 North, Range 53 West (Mekinock).
Apparently, Township 154 North, Range 52 West (Levant) was
not feasible.16 He claimed that "the new site could be
developed more economically, resulting in an estimated
savings of approximately $1,000,000 in engineering and
presently programmed construction." Furthermore, "Soil and
terrain features are much more favorable for base
development at the new location." After receiving the
notice, Young telephoned King and informed him of the bad
news.

17

In testimony before the House Subcommittee on
Appropriations, General John Rodenhauser, Director of Real
Property, explained that "test borings disclosed that the
subsoil at the original site did not have the foundation
bearing capacity that the new site had, where alluvial
deposits have built up a gravel base there and enable us to
more cheaply erect our heavier structures."

18

The importance of the sub-soil could not be under
estimated since the runways would be required to support the
weight of the fighter and bomber aircraft. In addition, the
SAGE block building had to be constructed on a heavy base
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walls and floors designed to withstand a nuclear attack,
which required a firm foundation.
Within Grand Forks County are a number of ancient beach
areas "almost w oily composed of gravel" produced by Lake
Agassiz.19 Whi e the changes in water height formed the
numerous beacnes, the current and intensity of the wave
motion created the size and gravel content of each beach.
The Emerado Beach is among the most distinct in the county
standing eight to ten feet above the surrounding area and
varying in width from one hundred feet to one-half mile.
The Corp

used the eight to ten feet thick gravel sub-soil

of the Emerado Beach as a foundation for the runway and
other heavy facilities.

2n

Besides the advantage of locating the base over a gravel
sub-base, certain other soil characteristics also influenced
the

ecision. Map 2 on the following page illustrates that

Grard Forks County is divided into five basic physiographic
regions.

21

.

.

.

The Levant township is primarily composed of the

saline flats region with Ojata as the primary soil type, and
the Mekinock site is located in the Beach region with
Gardena as its primary soil type.
The characteristics of the Ojata soil are strong
alkalinity (7.4-9.0%), clay sub-soil, and very strong
•

•

salinity (8-16).

22

The soil also has a moderate shrink-swell

potential. Soil and water features include high corrosion
potential to uncoated steel and moderate potential to

(Unpublished T h esis, University o f North Dakota, 1959): 7 , 19. The map shows the fiv e s o i l
ty"e areas within the counts. The three townships involved in the s i t e s e le c tio n orocess
are squared o f f . The Emerado Beach is shown going through the countv by the dotted lin e .
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concrete, a high potential to frost heave, and a high water
table of 0-1.0 foot with very slow infiltration (.06-.6
inches per hour) making it conducive to flooding."3
The Gardena soil has good topsoil with a gravel-sand
sub-soil, low salinity (less than 2) and low alkalinity
(6.6-7.8%), good drainage, and low shrink-swell potential.

24

Soil and water features include moderate corrosion to
uncoated steel, low corrosion to concrete, and moderate
infiltration rate with a four to six foot water table.25
Based on the roil characteristics and the gravel sub
soil base at Mekinock, the Air Force made the correct
decision in locating the base at the Mekinock site. The low
shrink-swell potential would cause less damage to the runway
and roads in the long run. Furthermore, the low salinity and
alkalinity would reduce corrosion to both concrete and
steel. The lower water table and higher infiltration rate
would reduce flooding, which was more prevalent in the Ojata
soil areas. The Air Force also chose to locate Minot Air
Force Base on soil formed by glacial till with a low to
moderate shrink-swell potential.20
According to the Air Force reasons for the changes, the
Levant site would require higher construction and
operational costs in the long term; whereas, the Mekinock
site would require an initial high outlay of funds for land
but this would be offset by lower construction and
operational costs. If the Air Force had located on the poor
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soil, the long terra damage would have cost the Air Force
more to repair the runway and other facilities than it
had to pay in the higher price for the land initially.
Young now sought to dispel the rumors among the Grand
Forks city leaders concerning his actions in the site
selection. He wrote Amos Martin, Secretary of the Grand
Forks Chamber of Commerce, "Apparently any explanation of my
actions to you would be entirely useless," but Young went on
to briefly explain his reasons.27 He objected to a site with
much higher cost and the damage that would occur to a nearby
turkey farm. He also protested that in the future the base
might be abandoned and would be a terrible waste of good
farm land. With the knowledge that the Air Force had
selected the site, Martin decided to drop the matter and
thanked Young for his help.28
But one last bout between city leaders and land owners
took place in March. On 6 March editor Oppegard, speaking
through a Herald editorial, called upon the land owners to
make a sacrifice.

He stated the land owners did not have

all the information in the selection of the site. He
continued, trying to convince the skeptical, "full
consideration" had been given to the first site, but the
second site was found better. On the 19th letters from King
and James Veitch rejected Oppegard's call for a sacrifice
and stated the standard reasons for the opposition. Both
asked whether city officials would be willing to sacrifice
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their homes and land, if the choice had been thrust upon
them.30
While the site selection in Grand Forks County had
created some problems, the Minot site proceeded on schedule.
At first, speculation placed the base north of the city
within Tatman Township, but the decision was not made until
October, when the Air Force announced the base would be
located primarily in the eastern part of Waterford Township.
By 27 October five survey crews including a subgrade testing
crew were in the area conducting tests and drilling over one
hundred-thirty holes throughout the area.31
The Air Force then instructed the Corps of Engineers to
create a Real Estate Planning Report which outlined the
features of each site. The Real Estate Planning Report of 1
November 1954 for Minot Air Force Base estimated the total
land acquisition to be 3,961.19 acres at an average cost of
$42.82 per acre totaling $169,631.32 The value of the
buildings was $34,675 and the total cost which included
severance damages, mineral rights, resettlement costs, and
contingencies, would be $258,045 at $56.85 per acre.33 A 10
percent ($1,868.30) loss in tax income would be felt by the
state, county, township, and school districts.
The Minot base would be situated in Township 157 Ranges
82 and 83, eleven miles north of Minot. The land was
primarily utilized for grain and dairy production. There
were twenty-one different land owners, while tenants worked
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65 percent of the land. Five houses were located on the
land, with three occupied by the owners, one by a tenant,
and the other vacant. Only two children attended a nearby
school.
The land at Minot was divided into twenty-four tracts
with ownership extending over forty years. The soil
contained glacial till and was "very productive." The report
considered accessibility "very good", with Highway 83 to the
east, and listed a three-fourths mile electric line as the
only relocation.34 In reference to underground minerals, the
report stated that the nearest producing oil well was thirty
miles away and the mineral rights were "negligible."
The Real Estate Planning Report for the Grand Forks site
had a total of $570,950 for 5,385.61 acres.35 Of this
amount, $398,790.75 went for purchasing the land, while
$73,500 reimbursed the owners for improvements. An
additional $76,500 went for damages and contingencies, and
$7,500 applied to family relocation expenses. The loss in
tax to the state, county, township and school districts
would be substantial with a 25 percent or $4,912.74 loss
annually.
The report stated that the $65,000 donated by the commu
nity would be used to purchase land for sewage facilities.36
The report considered transportation facilities ideal, with
Highway 2 to the south and the Great Northern Railway in the
vicinity. The site had thirty-four different tracts with
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twenty-two land owners, of which ten were owner-operators.
Ten houses were located on the land with five inhabited by
owners, four by tenants, and one vacant. The soil was
underlain with gravel but very productive. Seven miles of
road, telephone lines, and electrical lines would have to be
relocated.
In determining the value of the land at both Mekinock
and Minot, the Corps examined previous land sales in the
area.37 At Mekinock the Corps examined twenty sales but
selected only seven to be used as a comparison. At Minot the
Corps used nine sales within an eight mile radius to
determine the value of the land.
The Air Force now encountered funding problems at the
Grand Forks location. Expecting to purchase relatively,
cheap land, the Air Force had only allocated sixteen
thousand dollars for the land at Grand Forks. The Air Force
thus requested additional funds of $493,000 on 27 June.
Grand Forks, meanwhile, modified its original offer of free
land to an offer of sixty-five thousand dollars. The Air
Force finally received the authority to reprogram funds
during fiscal year 1956 to purchase any needed land.
The Air Force now had to acquire the land and purchase
easements around the bases. The government offered the
appraised value of the land to each land owner. At both
sites nearly all the land owners turned down the offer,
which opened the way for the government to begin condemning
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the land. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution entitled
the land owners to the value of the land and damages in
flicted by the taking? therefore, the land owners could
contest the appraised value in court. A U.S. Marshal
delivered Declarations of Taking to each land owner for the
main portion of the land at both base sites.38
At the Mekinock site, land owners were told to surrender
their land by 31 January 1956 and the Air Force deposited
$343,360 at Fargo to pay for the land.39 The U.S. Treasury
Department deposited the fifty thousand dollars Minot
donated and the sixty five thousand offered by Grand Forks
as Certificates of Deposit in the account entitled
"Deposits, National Defense Conditional Gift Fund."40 The
money was credited to the Air Force to be used in the land
purchase. The U.S. District Court at Fargo issued checks to
the land owners in the sum of the individual appraised
value.
Meanwhile, construction crews began the occupation of
both sites. On the 5th and 8th of February 1956 the Herald
pictured James Vietch's house, now used by the builders as
the main operations building.41 The construction crews also
used Matilda Nelson's house for office space. Benson
Construction Company handled clearing the land of thirteen
groves of trees and over fifty-five rock piles. Ed Wolters,
a civilian contractor, headed the construction for the Corps
Engineers.
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Many of the families were upset over the decision to
locate the base where they lived. Certainly, the Herald1s
picturing of Veitch's former home rubbed salt in the wounds
of those who had already been forced from their homes. At
both locations land owners met to discuss the events and
Rethemeier and Redwing visited owners in Minot to compare
•
a?
issues.
Citizens at both locations felt trod upon by
frightened city officials and the government. Many of the
families had lived at the sites for over twenty years and
some of their children had been born in the homes now
destined for destruction.43
Following the Declaration of Taking, King and Daniel
Letness of Grand Forks filed complaints against the
government on the part of the land owners.44 Robert Vogel,
U.S. Attorney for the District of North Dakota, and Gordon
Thompson represented the government. King, Letness, and the
Day, Stokes, Vaaler, and Gillig law firm represented the
Grand Forks land owners. Federal District Judge Ronald N.
Davies presided over the case. In the Minot court case, held
in April 1957, the law firm of Ilvedson, Pringle, Herigstad,
and Meschke represented the land owners, while Federal
District Judge Dennis Donavan presided over the case.
The trials over land at both locations offered no "Perry
Mason" theatrics, but rather followed a standard set
of guidelines. Each involved the selection of appropriate
jurors. Usually both sides would challenge several choices
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until the final jury of twelve members remained along with
two alternates. The jurors viewed the land at the start of
the trial. The judge informed both guides only to point out
the land but not to provide additional information which
might prejudice the jurors. George Kadlac and Vernon
Botsford served as guides at the Mekinock site.45

The

attorneys for land owners reminded the jurors that the
land had been taken in 1955 and since that time extensive
construction had taken place. When possible, the attorneys
exhibited movies and photographs to illustrate the land
before construction. Expert witnesses could be crossexamined only once by each side regarding their qualifi
cations, and only three experts per side could testify on
each tract of land. Each land owner took the stand on his
own behalf and testified concerning the use of the land,
improvements, and the value of the land. The government
appraisers were also questioned by both sides regarding the
land value. Clarence Swendseid and George Kadlac testified
on behalf of the government concerning the Grand Forks site.46
The trial would continue until each tract of land had been
covered.
At Grand Forks three condemnation trials (Cases 3197,
3199, 3433) took place, while two land owners accepted the
government's appraised value of their land. At Minot four
trials (Cases 3121, 3139, 3172, 3269) took place, while
three owners accepted the appraised value. At Minot the
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three land owners who sold their tracts for the appraised
value were Robert Woodburn (62.12 acres for $2,875), Mabel
Hathaway (320 acres for $15,040), and Alwine Jensen (7.16
acres for $500) .4/

At Mekinock the two land owners who

accepted the government terms were Harriet Olson (80 acres
for $6,000) and Elsie Smith (60 acres for $5,100).48 Table 2
breaks down the land acquisition according to each court
49
,
. . .
case.
Appendices B and C illustrate the individual land
tracts at both sites. The table also illustrates the
difference between the appraised value and the subsequent
jury award. Of the thirty-nine land owners who contested the
appraised value, thirty-seven received higher awards after
the trials.
TABLE 2
LAND ACQUISITION FOR MINOT AND GRAND FORKS
AIR FORCE BASES, 1957-1959
Case

Owner

Tract

Acres

Jury
Award

Appraised

3269. .Dorothy 0'Rourke.. .101.. .... 160..
Ethel Yuly....... .108. .•••••80**

.$6,700. ..$6,700
. .4,676. ...3,600

3121. •Grace Bosard..... .104. .___ 160..
Lucy Overshiner... .106. .....160..
G. R. New'........ .107. .___ 400..
Ella Bryan.... . ...109. .....160..
Arthur Reinke.... .111...... 80. .
Ralph Anderson.... .112.. ___ 360. .
William Lazarus... .113. ... ..358 - ,
John Linton...... .119 . .--- 320..
Elmer Michaletz... .121. ..... 80. .
Ethel Yuly....... .122. ..... 80. .
Walter Blume...... .123 ........ 8 . .
Theodore Albresch. .124 ..--- 175. .
Edwin Nelson..... .126. .

.$8,000.
. .8,875.
.28,500.
. .9,000.
.,4,700.
.21,220.
,24,499.
.19,500.
..4,000.
. .4,500.
. ... 616.
.19,455.
..4,600.

..$6,500
...7,155
..24,300
..,7,650
...3,800
..16,900
. .21,750
..16,300
. .4,000
...3,8°0
.... 6 00
. .17,885
...3,800
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3139.. A. A. Detlaff.... 114.......77. ..$10,162. .. $7,338
A. G. Olsen....... 116...... 78..... 3,780 .. , .2,600
william Peters.... 117...... 478____4 7,670.. .41,000
Pearl Lawrence.... 118.......158 .... 12,066 .... 7,526
3172.. A. A. Detlaff.... 114.......102 . ..$10,065 . ..$6,034
3197. .John Whitnack..... 104......960. . .$97,483. .$67,950
James Veitch...... 106...... 160. .. .22,900. . .21,2 00
Mathilda Nelson___ 107...... 480____54,414. . .45,000
Leonard Griffen....108/116..390....51,093...36,250
Maurice Redwing....109..... 480....75,000...57,720
John Hall......... Ill...... 240____ 2 0,605. ..20,4 55
Edwin Rue......... 112...... 400___ 53,892.. .4 2,500
Oscar Moen........ 113.160....19,860...17,700
Nora Blackstad.....114/126..240____29,044...19,200
George Johnson.... 117....... 80..... 5,100...$4,900
Alberta Warnken....118..... 480....49,331...43,000
Edwin Osen........ 121.......80......6,520 ... .5,600
Mary King......... 127.......80 ......6,920 ... .5,800
3199 . .Vivian Osen....... 119.......80. ...$6,520...$5,600
334 3 ..Myra Foundation___ 122.160...$13,627..$11,986
Margaret Hyslop....124..... 380....51,476...31,000
George Rethemeier. .128...... 37.....6,322 .... 3,150
Fred Benson........129.55....10,399....5,500
Theodore Thompson..133..... 120 .... 25,751... 22,000
The jury-awarded sum also includes interest on the
additional award. Redwing, Warnken, Johnson, Hall, and Mary
King received compensation for plowing.50 Griffen, Moen,
Nelson, Redwing, Thompson, and Veitch received additional
compensation for buildings on their land at the Grand Forks
site, while Abresch, Bryan, Lazarus, Linton, and New
received compensation for buildings at the Minot site.51
Structures on the land could be removed at the owner's
expense or offered subsequently for sale by the government.
At the Minot site forty-six buildings valued at $34,675 were
removed and at Mekinock ninety-seven buildings valued at
$73,5C0 had to be removed.

The Air Force divided the fifty
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thousand dollars Minot donated among five tracts of lands:
104, $6,000; 111, $3,500; 112, $16,500; 113, $20,000; and
117, $4,000.5J The $65,000 donated by Grand Forks was used
to purchase a portion of John Whitnack's farm.54
Before the court cases began, the Corps of Engineers had
already begun construction. The Corps faced problems with
the climate and the sparse population. The climate impaired
the work season, while the sparse population led to labor
shortage problems.55

because of the calcium and chloride

content in the underground water, the Corps contracted with
Minot to obtain water from the Souris River and with Grand
Forks to obtain water from the Red River of the North.
Since North Dakota frost could penetrate six feet, the Corps
gave primary consideration to the runway construction. To
alleviate "subgrade weakening and pavement heave," the
runways had a base and pavement thickness of seventy-two
inches.56 The Corps also elevated both runways above the
surrounding area to prevent snow build-up. At Grand Forks,
the Corps utilized a north-south beach ridge of the ancient
Lake Agassiz. By placing the runway on top of the beach
ridge, frost susceptibility decreased.
To what extent was the Air Force correct in changing the
original location in Grand Forks County from the Levant site
to the Mekinock site? The site in Grand Forks created more
controversy than the Minot site for several reasons. Unlike
Minot, the Air Force vacillated between various sites in the
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county, which created a local situation similar to the
previous state-wide controversy. The Grand Forks site was
also more populated than the Minot site. Obviously, the Air
Force did not take the Rye Township site seriously. Since it
was but five miles from Grand Forks, the site did not meet
the ten-to-fifteen mile criceria. The 17 June 1954 announce
ment, which named the North Dakota base sites, contained
another indication of the Air Force's intention. The
statement said a site ten to fifteen miles northwest of the
city would be selected. Even before the announcement the Air
Fc

h«.

discarded the land Hansen had first offered.

There were several iinpor

nt considerations in choosing

the exact location in Grand Forks County. The Air Force had
to find a site ten to fifteen miles from the city with road
and railroad access and, preferably, north of the city but
within the county. The North Dakota-Minnesota state border
effectively eliminated sites to the east of Grand Forks,
while the Turtle River and Kelly's Slough cut through the
remaining portion of the county northwest of the city, thus
limiting potential areas. At both sites, the Air Force had
access to railroad and highway facilities. At Levant the
Great Northern rail line and Highway 81 passed through the
township, but at Mekinock, the Air Force could utilize
Burlington Northern rail lines on the north and south and
Highway 2 to the south.
With the transportation considerations examined, the
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Air Force could now study both sites in more detail. As a
result, the Corps conducted soil and sub-soil tests. After
conducting extensive soil tests at each possible area, the
Mekinock site was the only site feasible for construction.
Planned as a minimum twenty-five year permanent base,
both Minot and Grand Forks have surpassed that time limit.
Many mission and weapon system transitions have taken place
at Grand Forks and Minot Air Force bases as technology has
changed.
In January 1957 the 478th Fighter Group was activated at
Grand Forks and in December 1957 the Grand Forks Air Defense
Sector of NORAD was activated. On 13 August 1958 the first
of the two SAGE computers was installed. In September 1958
the 4133rd Strategic Wing of SAC was activated under the
command of the 15th Air Force as part of the dispersal
program. On 15 December 1959 the SAGE center became
operational; Map 3 on the following page shows the four U.S.
and two Pinetree radar stations in Manitoba in the Grand
Forks sector.57

In February 1960 the 905th Air Refueling

Squadron activated and the first of ten Boeing KC-135A
Stratotankers arrived in May. Also in May, the 18th FIS
transferred from Wurtsmith AFB, Michigan, to Grand Forks.58
The following month the first F-101B Voodoo "Blue Foxes" of
#
the 18th FIS arrived to be equipped with nuclear missiles.
In 1962 the first B-52G arrived and was equipped with the
nuclear AGM-28A Hound Dog missile. In February 1963 the
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M IN O T AND GRAND FORKS A I R D E F E N S E S E C T O R S

LEGEND
A. M inot AFB SAGE S e c to r
1. S a sk a to o n M ou n tain , S a3k.
2 . Y o rk to n , S ask .
3. Opheim AFS, Montana
4 . F o rtu n a AFS, N.D.
5. M iles C ity AFS, Montana
6. Sundance AFS, Wyoming
7. E lls w o r th AFB, S.D .
8 . D ick in so n AFS, N.D.
9 . Minot AFS. N.D.

B. Grand Forks AFB SAGE S e c to r
1. G y p su in v ille , M anitoba
2 . B e a u s e jo u r , M anitoba
3. F in le y AFS, N.D.
4. Wadena AFS, M innesota
5 . G e tty s b u rg AFS, S.D .
6 . C h an d le r AFS, M innesota

Map Three. Adapted from SAGE C onfiguration C h art, Maxwell AFB
H is to r ic a l Research Center, Alabama, May 1982; F ile "A ir Force
S t a tio n s ," received from Mark Morgan, Fort Worth, Texas.
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4133rd was redesignated the 319th Heavy Bombardment Wing and
in July ADC turned the base over to SAC.
Following the establishment of the SAC bomb wing, the
base soon began to undergo other transitions. In 1963 the
SAGE center was shut down and the radar units were trans
ferred to the SAGE center at Duluth International Airport,
,

Minnesota.

CQ

,

In 1964 construction began on the LGM-30F

Minuteman II missile complex and the 321st Strategic Missile
Wing became operational in 1966. The 1970's and 1980's saw
little overall operational change but was it time for
replacing weapons. In February 1971 the 18th FIS was
replaced with the 460th FIS equipped with F-106 Delta Darts,
but almost immediately inactivated on 15 April 1971. In 1973
the Minuteman II missiles were updated with 150 LGM-30G
Minuteman Ill's. On 4 December 1986 the last B-52G departed
and madeway for the first of the 17 Rockwell B-1B Lancer
bombers which arrived in May 1987. The re-engined KC-135R
replaced the ageing KC-135A model during 1986-87. Along with
the new bombers and tankers, three Northrop T-38A's operate
under the 64th Tactical Fighter Wing.
Minot Air Force Base activated in January 1957 and the
Minot Air Defense Sector activated on 1 April 1959. Map 3 on
the previous page shows the seven and two Pinetree radar
stations in Saskatchewan tied into the Minot SAGE center. On
1 February 1960 the 5th FIS "Spittin' Kittens" equipped with
F-106's Delta Darts transferred from Suffolk County AFB, New
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York.60 In July 1962 ADC transferred the base to SAC with
the 4136th

Strategic Wing as the host unit. In February

1963 the 4136th was redesignated the 450th Bombardment. Wing.
As at Grand Forks, SAC operated B-52H's and KC-135A's in the
dispersal program. On 15 August 1963 the Minot SAGE center
shut down with the 5th FIS and radars transferring to the
Great Falls AFB, Montana, SAGE center.61

Also in mid-1963,

150 AM-8 OB Minuteman I launch facilities were completed and
became operational with the activation of the 455th
Strategic Missile Wing the following year. In 1971 Minot
became the first base to have 150 LGM-30G Minuteman III
missiles which replaced the Minuteman I.6t

By 1970 the

455th SMW had been replaced by the 91st SMW and the 5th BMW
replaced the 450th. By the mid-1970's the total base
population had reached over 22,000 with more family housing
units than any other stateside Air Force installation 63
Several years after receiving F-15 Eagle fighters, the
5th FIS deactivated on 31 September 1988.
At Grand Forks the base acreage has continued to
.
. . .
.
64
expand past its initial boundaries.

In 1965 the Air Force

purchased eighty acres from Leonard Griffen for a family
housing project. In 1974 another eighty acres was purchased
for a sanitary land fill. In 1974 and 1978 the Air Force
purchased another eighty acres for an additional housing
project.
At Minot, the Air Force purchased 225 acres in 1957-58
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for a runway extension and, in 1960, 107 acres for a housing
project and forty acres for sewage facilities.55

In 1974 the

Air Force purchased fifty acres from Elmer Michaletz for a
satellite basing system.
Both bases have had an enormous economic impact on the
surrounding areas. The total economic impact of Grand Forks
AFB on the surrounding region amounted to $225.4 million
in 1989.66 Over 1,500 secondary jobs were created in 1989 in
the Grand Forks area. The payroll for Grand Forks AFB in
1989 exceeded $133.3 million.67

At Minot AFB the total

economic impact reached $180 million with 1,088 secondary
jobs created in 1989.58 The payroll for Minot AFB totaled
over $128.7 million.69
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
It has been over thirty years since the Air Force
selected the sites for the Grand Forks and Minot bases. The
myths concerning their establishment still persist. These
include the significance of the land donations and the
perception that Grand Forks and Minot "won" the bases due to
their fast and strenous efforts. The grandiose claims of the
Grand Forks Herald and Minot Daily News after the selection
etched the myths in steel. The belief that Grand Forks
provided all the land at the present base location and the
establishment of the base was without complication are also
false. These long held perceptions, accepted without
question, are dissolved once the facts have been examined.
Misunderstanding, bad planning, and a lack of trust in
the military resulted in the site selection controversy
within North Dakota. The Air Force failed to understand the
results of their short-sightedness in choosing to locate
first at Bismarck and Fargo. They could not fully explain
the military reasons for the final location, since most of
the information was top secret and had not been released to
the public. North Dakota citizens could only view the events
within a scenario that lacked the important military
113
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requirements. The citizens also exhibited a distrust of the
military, as if it were inconceivable that the Air Force
would decide matters on a military basis and not political.
In truth, a combination of military, safety, geographic,
technological, operational, and geological influences
determined the location of Grand Forks and Minot Air Force
bases.
North Dakota was net unique in its site selection
controversy. In the 1950's, the Air Force encountered
problems over the selection and utilization of sites in
other states. By far the greatest turmoil occurred in
Michigan where the Air Force chose a site in Benzie County
in north central Michigan to provide a defense in depth for
the Detroit-Chicago area.’

But following opposition from a

music camp fifteen miles away, the Air Force had to find
another site. In the following confusion, Congressional
meddling, and public outcry, the Air Force selected three
sites, Cadillac, Kalkaska, and Manistee. With Congressional
leaders unable to agree on a site, the Air Force eventually
2
dropped the project in 1956.
At Olmstead AFB, Pennsylvania, and Portland Inter
national Airport, Oregon, the Air Force had to seek
locations outside the cities when city leaders and the Air
Force could not agree on proposed expansion of the
existing airports.3

After being forced out of O'Hare

International Airport, Illinois, because of over-crowding,
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the Air Force established Richard-Bong AFB in Wisconsin.
Controversy also followed the site selection of Grandview
AFB, Missouri.
When the Air Force announced the sites of the North
Dakota bases, they also announced the selection of a site at
Glasgow, Montana. The Air Force had selected the general
Glasgow-Miles City area in Montana in February 1954, but
eventually chose the more northern location of Glasgow.
Initially, they chose to use the city airport, which had
been used during World War II. But then, just as in North
Dakota, they sought a site outside the city. As in North
Dakota, Colonel Munns visited the city in February and May
asking the city for a resolution.6

Glasgow also provided

the Air Force with $34,500 for the purchase of land to the
north of the city.7
Despite the constant operational changes, the basic
landscape of the bases has remained the same. Standing to
the northwest of Grand Forks Air Force Base near George
Rethemeier's farm, one can view the length of the nearly
three mile runway with the tails of the aircraft sticking
into the air. It does rot take much imagination to see the
landscape as it used to be before the base— the houses with
the trees surrounded by fields of growing wheat. The former
serenity has now been replaced by a small city. The same
images appear when one looks at Minot Air Force Base from
Highway 83 as an occasional B-52 lumbers overhead, as they
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have done for over thirty years.
At the Mekinock site which had the highest population
and greatest dislocation, remnants of the former landscape
still remain. On the base, Maurice Redwing's barn still
stands near the new multi-million dollar B-1B three-bay
hangar; it is now used as the base horse stables. To the
west, the foundation is all that remains of the Cooper
School and to the south across Highway 2, the abandoned
facilities of the Myra Turkey farm still stand. Most of the
former land owners moved to farms close to their former home
site.
A former land fill on Grand Forks Air Force Base is no
longer discernible to the base personnel driving by it
each day. The SAGE building now houses the 321st Strategic
Missile Wing Headquarters and few even know of the former
SAGE mission of the base. The land purchased to build a
cross-wind runway, now lies idle with weeds. The former
small village of Emerado one mile south of the base has now
expanded northward.
Likewise, Minot has seen expansion north of the
city reaching slowly out to the base. Lynch Church in the
northeast corner of the base was saved from destruction by
being just outside the area acquired by the government. As
at Grand Forks, a secondary runway was not built, and the
SAGE building houses the base headquarters. Theodore
Abresch's buildings were bulldozed under to make way for the
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runway. Base family nousing units now stand where William
Lazarus's house used to be, and bombers and tankers are
parked on the alert pad over the site of John Linton's home.
Meanwhile, base personnel leisurely play golf across his
former farm.
Both bases are symbols of a by-gone era and were
constructed during those few years when the Air Force feared
another surprise aircraft attack like Pearl Harbor. The
surprise attack never materialized and in its place the fear
of an ICBM attack arose. North Dakota's strategic location
has made it possible for the continuance of operations at
both bases. Since the Air Force switched from air defense to
strategic offense, only a few short years after the bases
were established, the bases became central locations for
long-range bombers and ICBM's. Grand Forks has now been
selected to receive the LGM-118A Peacekeeper missile. If
the Air Force is allowed to complete the project, more
land will be required, once again disrupting the lives of
the surrounding farmers.
With budget cuts in defense spending and easing of Cold
War tensions, the fate of the two North Dakota bases remains
uncertain. As the Soviet threat decreases, so does the need
for either of the expensive bases. As the foundation upon
which both bases were built crumbles, the Grand Forks and
Minot bases may become empty fixtures on the North Dakota
prairie and monuments to a past era in history.
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APPENDIX

A

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS
ADC

Air Defense Command

ADS

Air Defense Sector

ADSEC

Air Defense Scientific Engineering Committee

AFB

Air Force Base

ANG

Air National Guard

BOMARC

Boeing and Michigan Aeronautical Research Center

CONAD

Continental Air Defense

DEW

Distant Early Warning

FIS

Fighter Interceptor Squadron

ICBM

Inter-continental Ballistic Missile

JCS

Joint Chiefs of Staff

NSC

National Security Council

SAC

Strategic Air Command

SAGE

Semi-automatic Ground Environment

*Note: LASHUP is not an acronym.
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B

Base, Real Estate Division, U.S. Army Corps of Enqineers, Omaha,
Nebraska.
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MINOT AIR FORCE BASE LAND TRACTS
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• Buildings

Map Five: Adapted from Land Acquisition Map, Minot Air Force Base, Real Estate
Division, U,S. Army Corns of Engineers, Omaha, Nebraska.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
In researching this thesis a wide variety of sources
were used with many pertaining only to one particular
subject. The best sources for general information concern
ing the Air Force in the post-war period are Alfred
Goldberg's A History of the United States Air Force and
Robert Furtrell's Ideas. Concepts. Doctrine. Although
information on SAGE is scarce, as well as classified,
several excellent sources are available. Richard McMullen's
ADC Historical Study #33 and Charles Smith's History of the
Electronic Systems Command. Volume One are two excellent
sources. Mark Morgan, an Air Force historian residing in
Fort Worth, Texas, provided a wealth of details and facts
concerning SAGE. The Public Documents are perhaps one of the
most valuable and overlooked resources for examining events
as they occurred.
There were many frustrations in trying to obtain
information also. Many areas are still classified and not
open to the public. The Grand Forks Chamber of Commerce
records for the time period have been destroyed, as well as
the minutes of the condemnation trials. The biggest frus
tration came from the lack of first-hand sources. Colonel
Fred Mauck died in a plane crash, ironically at Minot AFB in
1967. General Joe Kelly died of throat cancer in 1979. Both
General Lee Washbourne and Colonel Oran Price are also
deceased.
Primary
A. Court Cases
United States of America v s . 3.835.76 Acres of Land, et a l ..
Case Number 3197. Central Plains Region Archives, Kansas
City, Missouri.
United States of America vs. 2,462.01 Acres of Land, et al..
Case Number 3121. Central Plains Region Archives, Kansas
City, Missouri.
United States of America v s . 871.38 Acres of Land, et al..
Case Number 3139. Central Plains Region Archives, Kansas
City, Missouri.

123

12 4

United States of America V3. 128.84 Acres of Land, et a l ..
Case Number 3172. Central Plains Region Archives,
Kansas City, Missouri.
United States of America vs. 240.00 Acres of Land. et a l ..
Case Number 3269 . Central Plains Region Archives,
Kansas City, Missouri.
B. Interviews
Benham, Master Sergeant. Jim. Interview by Rich Nolan, 29
November 1987, 11 February 1988, and 17 April 1988.
Griffen, Leonard. Interview by Rich Nolan, 24 May 1989.
King, Richard. Interview by Rich Nolan, 7 March 1988, 5
April 1988, and 17 May 1989.
Michaletz, Elmer. Interview by Rich Nolan, 17 May 1989.
Rethemeier, Ernst. Interview by Rich Nolan, 17 March 1988.
Rethemeier, George. Interview by Rich Nolan, 27 May 1989.
Redwing, Maurice. Interview by Rich Nolan, 17 March 1988.
C. Letters
Fowler, Colonel Winston C., Sun City, Arizona, to Rich
Nolan, Chanute AFB, Illinois, 7 November 1989.
Kane, Francis, Exter, New Hampshire, to Rich Nolan, Chanute
AFB, Illinois, 9 August 1989, 26 August 1989, and 6
September 1989.
Morgan, Mark, Fort Worth, Texas, to Rich Nolan, Chanute AFB,
Illinois, 12 August 1989, 27 August 1989, and 29 August
1989.
Schoenberg, Colonel Irving, Dunwoody, Georgia, to Rich
Nolan, Chanute AFB, Illinois, 27 July 1989.
Voss, Colonel Robert, Belleville, Illinois, to Rich Nolan,
Chanute AFB, Illinois, 20 September 1989.

125
D. Manuscripts
Milton Young Papers. O’-in G. Libby Manuscript Collection,
Elwyn B. Robinson Department of Special Collection,
Chester Fritz Library, University of North Dakota.
Otto Kreuger Papers. Orin G. Libby Manuscript Collection,
Elwyn B. Robinson Department of Special Collection,
Chester Fritz Library, University of North Dakota.
William Lancer Papers. Orin G. Libby Manuscript Collection,
Elwyn B. Robinson Department of Special Collection,
Chester Fritz Library, University of North Dakota.
E. Maps
Atlas of Grand Forks County. Milbank, SD: Midland Atlas
Company, 1967.
Atlas of Ward County. Milbank, SD: Midland Atlas Company
1982.
Platbook of Grand Forks Countv. North Dakota. Fergus Falls,
MN: Thomas 0. Nelson Company, 1951.
U.S. Department of the Interior Geological Survey. Arvilla
Quadrangle. North Dakota. Denver, CO: U.S. Department
of the Interior Geological Survey, 1963.
U.S. Department of the Interior Geological Survey.
Bismarck. North Dakota. Denver, CO: U.S. Department of
the Interior Geological Survey, 1950.
U.S. Department of the Interior Geological Survey.
Burlington S E . North Dakota. Denver, CO: U.S. Depart
ment of the Interior Geological Survey, 1949.
U.S. Department of Interior Geological Survey. Emerado
Quadrangle. North Dakota. Denver, CO: U.S. Department of
the Interior Geological Survey, 1931.
U.S. Department of the Interior Geological Survey. Fargo
North Quadrangle. North Dakota. Denver, CO: U.S.
Department of the Interior Geological Survey, 1959.
U.S. Department of the Interior Geological Survey. Menoken
S W . North Dakota. Denver, CO: U.S. Department of the
Interior Geological Survey, 1951.

126
U .S . Department of the Interior Geological Survey. Minot.
North Dakota. Denver, CO: U.S. Department of the
Interior Geological Survey, 1949.
U.S. Department of the Interior Geological Survey.
Waterford. North Dakota. Denver, CO: U.S. Department of
the Interior Geological Survey, 1951 and 1979.
F. Miscellaneous
City Council Proceedings. Grand Forks. Series I, Volume
19-20. Elwyn B. Robinson Special Collections, Chester
Fritz Library, University of North Dakota.
Grand Forks and Minot Air Force Base Files C2-3-006/7, Real
Estate Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha
Nebraska.
Minot Chamber of Commerce Records. North Dakota State
Archives, Bismarck, North Dakota.
Real Estate Planning Report. Grand Forks AFB. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, Missouri River Basin, Real Estate
Division, Omaha, Nebraska.
Real Estate Planning Report. Minot AFB. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, Missouri River Basin, Real Estate Division,
Omaha, Nebraska.
University Relations Files. Elwyn B. Robinson Special
Collection, Chester Fritz Library, University of North
Dakota.
G. Newspapers
Air Force T imes, 8 August 1953, 30 January 1954, 13 February
1954, 10 August 1954.
Bismarck Tribune. February-August 1954.
Fargo Forum. February 1951, February-August 1954.
Glasgow Courier. Montana, February-May 1954.
Grand Forks AFB File, "Newspaper Articles Dealing with Base
Establishment." 321st SMW Historian, Grand Forks AFB.
Grand Forks Herald. February 1954-October 1955.

127
Grand Forks Herald Files. "54-59 GFAFB", "1960's GFAFB",
"1970's GFAFB", and "GFAFB Defense Sector". Grand Forks
Herald Archives.
Jame^town Sun, February-April 1954.
Minot Daily News. February-October 1954.
Valley City Times. 11 May 1954.
Ward County Independent. February-August 1954.
H. Public Documents
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings .
Department of Air Force Appropriations for 1953. 84th
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956.
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings.
Department of Air Force Appropriations for 1954. 83rd
Cong., 1st Sess., 1953.
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings.
Department of Air Force Appropriations for 1955. 83rd
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954.
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings.
Department of Defense and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 1954. 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953.
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings.
Department of Defense and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 1955. 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954.
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings.
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957. 84th
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956.
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings.
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958. Part One
and Two, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957.
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings.
Military and Naval Construction Appropriations for 1956.
Department of the Air Force, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1955.
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings.
Military and Naval Construction Appropriations for 1957.
84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956.

128

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings.
Military and Naval Construction for 1954. 83rd Cong.,
1st Sess., 1953.
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings.
Military Construction Appropriations for 1956.
Department of the Air Force. 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1955.
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings,
Military Construction Appropriations for 1957. 84th
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956.
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings.
Military Public Works Appropriations for 1952. 82nd
Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings.
Military Public Works Construction Appropriations for
1953. Part 3., Department of the Air Force. 82nd Cong. ,
2nd Sess., 1952.
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings.
Military Public Works #20. 84th Congress, 1st Sess.,
1955.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations,
Hearings. Department of Air Force Appropriations for
1953, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations,
Hearings. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957.
84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations,
Hearings. Military and Naval Construction Authorization.
83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations,
Hearings, Supplemental Appropriations Bill for 1955.
83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations,
Hearings. Supplemental Appropriations Bill for 1957.
84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Hearings. Military and Naval Construction. 83rd Cong.,
1st Sess., 1953.

129
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Hearings. Military Construction Authorization. 85th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1957.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Hearings. Military Public Works Construction. 34th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1955.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Hearings. Military Public Works Construction. 84th
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Hearings. Study of Airpower Parts I-XXXIII. 84th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 1956.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Hearings. Supplemental Military Construction
Authorization (Air Force), 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958.
U.S. Congressional Record. 83rd Congress, 2nd Sess., 1954,
Volume 100, Part 8.
Secondary
A. Articles
Air Force Magazine.
1957): 251-259.

"Air Defense in North America."

(August

________ . "Airpower in the News." (June 1954): 14.
________ . "A Wall Twelve Miles High." (June 1956): 50-54.
________ . "Guide to Air Force Bases." (September 1954): 8393.
________ . "How SAGE Will Tighten Up Our Air Defenses." (June
1956): 58-59.
________ . "What's in a Wing?" (September 1953):

51-52.

Air University Quarterly Review. "The Emerging Shield, Part
One: The Air Defense Ground Environment." (Spring 1956):
49-60.
Annals of the History of Computing. Special Issue: SAGE.
(October 1953).
Corddry, Charles. "Burglar Alarm." Air Force Magazine (June
1956): 77-80, 83, 84.

130
Culpepper, Jack. "Airpower in the News." Air Force Magazine
(April 1954): 12.
Engineering News Record. "Airbase Problem: Beat the
Weather." (31 May 1956): 34-39.
Haggerty, James. "The Electronic Paul Revere." Colliers (3
February 1956): 82-35.
Laird, Wilson. "The Geology and Ground Water Resources of
the Emerado Quadrangle." North Dakota Geological Survey
Bulletin (Volume 17, 1944): 1-29.
Murphy, Charles. "The U.S. as a Bombing Target." Fortune
(November 1953): 118-121, 219-220.
Ulman, William. "Russian Planes are Raiding our Skies."
Col1iers (16 October 1953): 32-44.
Valley, George E., Jr. "How the SAGE Development Began."
Annals of the History of Computing (July 1985): 196225.
B. Books
Air Force Magazine. ed. Almanac of Airpower. New York:
Arco, 1989.
Francillon, Rene. The Air Guard. Osceola, W I : Motorbooks
International, 1982.
Furtrell, Robert F.. Ideas. Concepts. Doctrine. 2nd ed.
New York: Arno Press, 1980.
Goldberg, Alfred, ed.. A History of the United States Air
Force. 1907-1957. Princeton, N J : D. Van Nostrand, 1957
Gross, Charles. Prelude to Total Force: The Air National
Guard, 1943-1969. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force
History, 1985.
IBM. The SAGE/BOMARC Air Defense Weapons System— Fact Sheet.
Kingston, NY: IBM, 1959.
Jockel, Joseph. No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada. the United
States. and the Origins of North American Air Defense.
1945-1958. Vancouver: University of British Columbia
Press, 1987.
Mueller, Robert. Air Force Bases, Volume On e . Washington,
D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1989.

131
Redmond, Kent, and Thomas Smith. Project Whirlwind: The
History of Pioneer Computer. Bedford, MA: Digital Press,
1980
U.S. Department. of Agriculture. Soil Survey of Grand Forks
Countv. North Dakota. 1981. U.S. Department of Agri
culture.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Soil Survey of Ward Countv.
North Dakota. 1974. U.S. Department of Agriculture.
C. Miscellaneous
A Decade of Continental Air Defense. 1946-1956. HQ CONAD:
Directorate of Historical Studies, nd. Received from Ed
Russell, Research Division, Maxwell AFB, on 27 September
1989.
Air Base File. Office of Daniel Letness, Grand Forks, North
Dakota.
Air Force Stations File. Received from Mark Morgan, Fort
Worth, Texas, on 27 August 1989.
Cooper, Jerry. Citizen Soldiers: The North Dakota National
Guard in the Cold W a r . 1946-1962. North Dakota Institute
for Regional Studies, 1986, (pp. 384, 395). Received
from MSgt. Steven Stearns, ANG Historian, Andrews AFB,
on 21 August 1989.
Cost Branch. "Economic Resource Impact Statement: Grand
Forks AFB." Grand Forks AFB, Fiscal Year 1989.
Cost Branch. "Economic Resource Impact Handbook: Minot AFB."
Minot AFB, Fiscal Year 1989.
Folder on SAGE, includes Chapter 4, "SAGE," (pp. 130-132)
and Chapter Five, "The Status of SAGE," (pp. 111- 121).
Received from Ed Russell, Research Division, Maxwell
AFB, on 27 September 1989.
Fuller, John. "Trial by Controversy: The Evolution of
American Airpower from Birth to North Dakota." Unpub
lished Master's Thesis, University of North Dakota,
1966.
Grove, Clayton. "Land Utilization in Grand Forks County,
North Dakota." Unpublished Master's Thesis, University
of North Dakota, 1959.

132
McMullen, Richard. ADC Historical Study #33: The Birth of
SAGE. Received from Robert Kipp, AFSPACMD Historian,
Peterson AFB, 18 August 1989.
McMullen, Richard. ADC Historical Study #38; The Air
National SMar^ in hil. Bfifisaas* 1946-1971. Received ‘-"rom
Robert Kipp, AFSPACMD Historian, Peterson AFB, 12
January 1990.
North Dakota Air National Guard: 119 FIG. Received from
MSgt. Steven Stearns, ANG Historian, Andrews AFB, on 21
August 1989.
Smith, Charles. History of the Electronic Systems Command.
Volume One. SAGE: Background and Origins. Bedford, MA:
Electronic Systems Command, 1964. Received from E.
Micheal Del Papa, Chief Historian ESD/HQ, Hanscom AFB,
on 8 June 1989.
Spivey, Capt. Samual. "History of Grand Forks AFB." Unpub
lished Manuscript. 321st SMW Historian, Grand Forks Air
Force Base.

